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Sanctions and the Blurred Boundaries of 




I.  INTRODUCTION 
Economic sanctions are often said to occupy a middle space between 
communiqués and combat.1  As this description makes clear, sanctions are a 
political tool – but a political tool that operates through economic regulation.  
They are simultaneously economic and political.2 
Their dual nature seems to place sanctions in a twilight zone, neither tru-
ly in nor out of the academic discipline of international economic law 
(“IEL”).  Sanctions tend to be marginalized in IEL scholarship, generally 
taking little space in the IEL literature and at the podiums of IEL conferences 
and courses.  While economic sanctions loom large today in headline news 
and the practice of international trade law, they are not proportionately repre-
sented in recent IEL literature.  Rather, IEL scholarship seems content to 
leave sanctions to other disciplines like public international law, economics, 
and international relations.  To be sure, sporadic controversies capture atten-
 
*Partner, Berliner Corcoran & Rowe LLP, Washington D.C.; Visiting Scholar, Seattle 
University School of Law.  The author thanks Tomer Broude, Anupam Chander, 
Erich Ferrari, Adrianne Goins, Meredith Kolsky Lewis, and Sirina Tsai for their valu-
able comments, as well as the organizers and participants of the biennial conference 
of the International Economic Law Interest Group of the American Society of Interna-
tional Law held at Georgetown University Law Center.  The views expressed here are 
my own and should not be attributed to my law firm or any of its clients.  All mis-
takes are my own.  The information in this Article is updated through October 1, 
2017. 
 1. Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Economic Sanctions: A Look Back and a Look 
Ahead, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1930, 1930 (1990) (reviewing BARRY E. CARTER, 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC SANCTIONS: IMPROVING THE HAPHAZARD U.S. LEGAL 
REGIME (1988)) (“[S]anctions send a message of disapproval – less grave than the use 
of force but more serious than just a communiqué followed by business as usual.”). 
 2. Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Trade Controls for Political Ends: Four Perspec-
tives, 4 CHI. J. INT’L L. 355, 369 (2003) (concluding that economic sanctions “will 
continue to hold a place at the intersection of politics, economics, and law”). 
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tion – typically when they implicate other IEL concerns, as when the Helms-
Burton brouhaha erupted at the then-fledgling World Trade Organization 
(“WTO”).3 
This Article contends that sanctions are part of IEL and they warrant 
more rigorous consideration in IEL scholarship.  Sanctions may lie at the 
edges of the IEL field, and they surely also stand in other fields, but this is no 
reason for IEL to overlook them.  As with “trade and labor” and the other 
cross-disciplinary “and” topics, exploring the edges is critical to understand-
ing the field – its definition, nature, values, and priorities.  Also, sanctions 
offer a rare example of economic regulation that cuts across many of the tra-
ditional subdivisions within IEL.  Sanctions thus nicely illustrate Andreas 
Lowenfeld’s observation in International Economic Law: 
[E]verything is related to everything else – trade to investment to 
monetary affairs, dispute settlement to sanctions and to unilateral ver-
sus collective action, economic law to ‘public international law’ and to 
‘private international law’. . . .  [I]t is worth keeping in mind that in-
ternational economic law influences, and is influenced by, both of 
these fields, and that the boundaries between them are inevitably 
blurred.4 
This Article proceeds in four parts.  Part II defines key concepts and 
gives an overview of economic sanctions law in the United States, introduc-
ing the statutes and regulations that govern the most sweeping U.S. sanctions 
programs.  Part III looks to the blurred external boundaries of IEL, drawing 
on the descriptions of the field offered by such foundational IEL scholars as 
John Jackson, Andreas Lowenfeld, and Georg Schwarzenberger to show that 
sanctions belong within IEL.  Part IV turns to the blurred internal boundaries 
within IEL, arguing that economic sanctions warrant further attention by IEL 
scholars because of the rare way they cut across so many IEL subdivisions.  
Part IV takes a deep look at the fifty-year-old U.S. embargo of Cuba to 
demonstrate how it regulates together trade, investment, finance, securities, 
intellectual property, and more – all in a single, remarkable sentence.  Finally, 
Part V highlights recent developments in sanctions law generating novel and 
timely questions for academic consideration.  In keeping with the themes of 
this Article, the examples in Part V need cross-disciplinary cooperation be-
tween IEL and other disciplines. 
It should be noted that this Article draws mainly from U.S. examples to 
support its theses about the nature and significance of sanctions.  These theses 
might also be illustrated with international and comparative examples.  Simi-
larly, the Article discusses many acts taken by the Obama administration.  
Again, however, while the Trump administration has started making im-
portant changes to sanctions policy, those developments continue to support 
 
 3. See infra Part III.  
 4. ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, Preface to the Second Edition of INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMIC LAW, at v, vii (2d ed. 2008). 
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the theses advanced here.  After all, the nature of sanctions policy endures: it 
is a political tool that operates through economic regulation.  Indeed, the re-
cent trends in U.S. sanctions policy towards creative design and aggressive 
enforcement are both likely to continue – and may press forward5 – making 
an even stronger case for scholarly attention. 
II.  A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO ECONOMIC SANCTIONS 
Lowenfeld often describes economic sanctions as “economic [or trade] 
controls for political ends.”6  Accordingly, he defines “economic sanctions” 
as “measures of an economic – as contrasted with diplomatic or military – 
character taken by states to express disapproval of the acts of the target state 
or to induce that state to change some policy or practice or even its govern-
mental structure.”7  It follows that sanctions “generally are measures taken 
not for economic gain, and often at commercial sacrifice” and that “the rea-
son for [the] action . . . is important in making the judgment that [the] action 
is a sanction.”8 
While generally aligned with Lowenfeld’s understanding of sanctions as 
economic measures taken for political reasons,9 this Article both enlarges his 
 
 5. For some early indications that these trends continue into the Trump admin-
istration, see infra notes 169–70. 
 6. LOWENFELD, supra note 4, at pt. VIII. 
 7. Id. at 850. 
 8. Id. at 850–51 & n.10; accord MICHAEL P. MALLOY, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS 
AND U.S. TRADE 12 (1990) (noting “the inherent definitional significance of the ob-
jectives of sanctions”); LORI FISLER DAMROSCH, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL LAW 
THROUGH NON-FORCIBLE MEASURES 43–44 (1997) (focusing on sanctions imposed 
for one particular reason, namely to enforce against violations of international law). 
 9. I prefer Lowenfeld’s definition to several others found in the sanctions litera-
ture.  First, Michael Malloy’s definition – “any country-specific economic or financial 
prohibition imposed upon a target country or its nationals with the intended effect of 
creating dysfunction in commercial and financial transactions with respect to the 
specified target, in the service of specified foreign policy purposes” – is similar in 
substance but less elegant.  MALLOY, supra note 8, at 13 (footnote omitted).  Malloy’s 
“country-specific” element excludes sanctions aimed at multiple targets or a class of 
similar targets (such as state sponsors of terrorism or states that conduct nuclear tests) 
and, hence, also excludes secondary sanctions.  See infra notes 52–62.  I also take 
issue with Malloy’s view that expressing disapproval is not an “appropriate objective” 
for triggering sanctions.  Compare MALLOY, supra note 8, at 13, 21 n.8, with Perry S. 
Bechky, Darfur, Divestment, and Dialogue, 30 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 823 (2009) (support-
ing the expressive values served by a federal law that authorizes U.S. states to divest 
from companies doing business with Sudan within specified bounds).  Second, Gary 
Hufbauer and Jeffrey Schott’s definition – “the deliberate government-inspired with-
drawal, or threat of withdrawal, of ‘customary’ trade or financial relations” – is over-
broad and omits the key purposive element.  MALLOY, supra note 8, at 12 (quoting 
GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER & JEFFREY J. SCHOTT, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS 
RECONSIDERED 3 (1985)).  Finally, Barry Carter’s definition – “coercive economic 
3
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definition and focuses on a particular subset of sanctions.  First, this Article 
eschews the state-centric limitation in Lowenfeld’s definition, recognizing 
that recent sanctions frequently target non-state actors, including terrorist 
groups, transnational criminal organizations, and drug kingpins.10  Second, 
this Article focuses on the broad sanctions programs administered by the Of-
fice of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) of the U.S. Department of the 
Treasury, omitting narrower measures that also inhibit economic activity for 
various political reasons – such as export controls administered by the State 
and Commerce Departments, Lacey Act restrictions on wildlife trafficking, 
and denial of most-favored-nation tariff status to communist countries that 
restrict emigration11 – even though similar arguments about such measures 
might also be made to support this Article’s main theses. 
OFAC maintains numerous sanctions programs, including “country-
based” programs that target governments and “list-based” programs that tar-
get specific persons.  The country-based programs today target mainly Cuba, 
Iran, and Syria, as well as the “Crimea region of Ukraine”12 and to some ex-
tent North Korea.13  OFAC has over twenty list-based programs targeting a 
 
measures taken against one or more countries to force a change in policies, or at least 
to demonstrate a country’s opinion about the other’s policies” – introduces a vague 
and contentious element of coercion and applies to only two of a range of possible 
political goals, omitting, for example, isolation, prevention, punishment, and regime 
change.  Id. (quoting CARTER, supra note 1, at 4); cf. DAMROSCH, supra note 8, at 43, 
54–57 (considering when sanctions may be deemed coercive under international law 
and offering several potential goals of sanctions in the context of enforcing interna-
tional law). 
 10. See, e.g., Transnational Criminal Organizations Sanctions Regulations, 31 
C.F.R. pt. 590 (2017); Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. pt. 595 (2017); 
Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. pt. 598 (2017). 
 11. See generally LOWENFELD, supra note 4. 
 12. OFAC’s sanctions programs are listed in 31 C.F.R. ch. V and on OFAC’s 
website, www.ustreas.gov/ofac.  Some sanctions programs have titles that may create 
the impression that they are country-based, while the substance reveals that they only 
target persons designated on the OFAC lists.  In this regard, the Ukraine Related 
Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. pt. 589 (2017), target listed persons – mainly Rus-
sians – while Executive Order 13,685, 79 Fed. Reg. 77,357 (Dec. 19, 2014), not yet 
incorporated into the OFAC regulations, adds sanctions directed against the territory 
of Russia-occupied Crimea. 
 13. The North Korea Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. pt. 510 (2017), mainly 
sanction listed persons but also include an import ban.  Separate regulations adminis-
tered by the Commerce Department impose special export controls against North 
Korea.  See 15 C.F.R. § 746.4 (2017).  With tensions escalating over North Korea’s 
nuclear program, President Trump, Congress, and the United Nations have all tight-
ened sanctions against North Korea so far in 2017.  Exec. Order No. 13,810, 82 Fed. 
Reg. 44,705 (Sept. 20, 2017); Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions 
Act (“CAATSA”), Pub. L. 115–44, 131 Stat. 886, 940 (Aug. 2, 2017) (to be codified 
at 22 U.S.C. § 9202).  Executive Order 13,810 broadly authorizes OFAC to impose 
secondary sanctions (explained infra at notes 48–62) against persons trading with 
North Korea, regardless of volume or nature of the sales.  This could spark legal and 
4
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wide variety of sanctioned persons, who are named on OFAC’s massive List 
of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (“SDN List”) or sev-
eral other OFAC lists;14 usually, the sanctions also apply to any entity that is 
fifty percent or more owned by listed persons.15 
OFAC operates mainly under the authority of the International Emer-
gency Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”).16  IEEPA authorizes the President 
to impose economic sanctions to respond to a national emergency.  In prac-
tice, this means that a President wishing to impose sanctions declares a na-
tional emergency in an executive order that simultaneously launches the sanc-
tions program and delegates to the Treasury Department the authority to im-
plement the program (in coordination with the State Department).17  The 
President must confirm annually, for each IEEPA program, that the emergen-
cy continues. 
Congress enacted IEEPA in 1977 in a post-Watergate effort to constrain 
Presidential action under the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917 
(“TWEA”).18  TWEA previously applied in times of “war or national emer-
gency” but is now limited to wartime.19  As Congress has not declared war 
since 1941, the President has not invoked TWEA even in times of armed 
 
diplomatic controversy depending how extensively, and against whom, OFAC uses 
this authority.  Further changes may make the North Korea program more like other 
country-based programs; for example, the UN requires all Member States to prohibit 
most “new joint ventures . . . with [North Korean] entities or individuals.”  S.C. Res. 
2371, ¶ 12 (Aug. 5, 2017).   
 14. OFAC’s lists are available on its website, www.ustreas.gov/ofac, including 
the SDN List (which is over 1000 pages long), the Foreign Sanctions Evaders List, 
and the Non-SDN Iran Sanctions Act List.  Happily, OFAC recently added to its web-
site a searchable “consolidated” database of all of its lists. 
 15. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, REVISED GUIDANCE ON ENTITIES OWNED BY 
PERSONS WHOSE PROPERTY AND INTERESTS IN PROPERTY ARE BLOCKED (Aug. 13, 
2014), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/sanctions/Documents/licensing_guidance.pdf (“[A]ny entity owned in the 
aggregate, directly or indirectly, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons 
is itself considered to be a blocked person.”). 
 16. International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1708 
(2012). 
 17. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,662, 79 Fed. Reg. 16,169, 16,170 (Mar. 20, 
2014) (“The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, is 
hereby authorized to take such actions, including the promulgation of rules and regu-
lations, and to employ all powers granted to the President by IEEPA, as may be nec-
essary to carry out the purposes of this order.”).  The Treasury Secretary then further 
delegates to OFAC the responsibility to administer the sanctions. 
 18. But see Lowenfeld, supra note 1, at 1937 (“[M]y perception – I do not have 
hard evidence in support – is that Congress . . . wrote [IEEPA] . . . and other legisla-
tion in the foreign economic policy area with enough play in the joints so that Presi-
dents would seem, but would not really be, reined in.”).  
 19. Pub. L. No. 95–223, § 101(a), 91 Stat. 1625 (1977) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 
4305). 
5
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conflict.20  However, Congress grandfathered pre-existing TWEA sanctions – 
a list that has dwindled over time to the point where TWEA now governs 
only one program: Cuba. 
An OFAC program may impose a near-total embargo against dealings 
with a sanctions target or a range of lesser sanctions.  For example, in re-
sponse to Russia’s occupation of Crimea, the United States restricted dealings 
with Crimea; imposed innovative “sectoral sanctions” restricting specified 
dealings with specified companies in Russia’s defense, energy, and finance 
sectors; added a number of Russians to the SDN List; and tightened certain 
export controls.21  The Russia program thus exemplifies several trends: it has 
both country-based and list-based aspects, part of the effort to make sanctions 
“smarter” and more targeted; it reveals the increasing variety and creativity of 
sanctions; and the Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security 
(“BIS”) plays an important role in administering it. 
Other statutes may expand or restrict presidential sanctions authority, ei-
ther in general or focused on a particular target or class of targets.  Important 
examples include: 
 The United Nations Participation Act (“UNPA”), which au-
thorizes the president to act in compliance with sanctions or-
dered by the Security Council.22 
 The Helms-Burton Act and the Cuban Democracy Act, which 
require the president to maintain sanctions against Cuba until 
certain requirements are met.23  A Congressional compromise 
in the Trade Sanctions Reform Act originally liberalized agri-
cultural sales, but it imposed strict payment requirements with 
regard to Cuba only, which constrained the Obama administra-
tion from further liberalizing trade with Cuba in this sector.24 
 The Berman Amendment, which precludes OFAC from re-
stricting trade with target countries of “information or infor-
 
 20. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,722, 55 Fed. Reg. 31,803 (Aug. 2, 1990) (im-
posing sanctions against Iraq under IEEPA); Exec. Order No. 12,724, 55 Fed. Reg. 
33,089 (Aug. 9, 1990) (expanding Iraq sanctions pursuant to IEEPA and United Na-
tions Participation Act (“UNPA”)); Exec. Order No. 13,290, 68 Fed. Reg. 14,306 
(Mar. 20, 2003) (confiscating certain Iraqi assets under IEEPA); Exec. Order 13,303, 
68 Fed. Reg. 31,931 (May 22, 2003) (amending Iraq sanctions pursuant to IEEPA and 
UNPA).  
 21. See supra note 12; 15 C.F.R. § 746.5 (2017). 
 22. 22 U.S.C. § 287c (2012). 
 23. Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act (“Helms-Burton 
Act”), 22 U.S.C. §§ 6032(h), 6064 (2012); Cuban Democracy Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 
6005, 6007 (2012). 
 24. Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act (“TSRA”), 22 U.S.C. 
§ 7207(b) (2012). 
6
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mational materials,” including art, books, and musical record-
ings.  Congress also stopped OFAC from prohibiting travel by 
U.S. nationals, except travel to Cuba.25 
 The Iran Sanctions Act (“ISA,” as amended), which requires 
the president to impose sanctions in certain circumstances on 
third-country companies that do business with Iran.26  The ISA 
is a good example of a sanctions program administered mainly 
by the State Department rather than OFAC. 
 The Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act 
(“CAATSA”), which tightened sanctions against Iran, North 
Korea, and Russia.27  Perhaps most significantly, CAATSA 
limits the president’s ability to end or even liberalize the sanc-
tions against Russia without Congressional approval.28 
OFAC sanctions are typically written in comprehensive prohibitory lan-
guage, which is then peeled back by exceptions.  OFAC has wide authority to 
issue licenses, which permit certain conduct that would otherwise be forbid-
den.29  Licensing authority gives OFAC flexibility to administer sanctions in 
ways that best serve U.S. policy (although Congress sometimes constrains 
that flexibility where the branches disagree on policy).30  There are two types 
of licenses: “general licenses” and “specific licenses.”31  OFAC publishes 
 
 25. Compare IEEPA, 50 U.S.C. § 1702(b)(3)–(4) (2012) (exemptions for travel 
and informational materials), with TWEA, 50 U.S.C. § 4305(b)(4) (2012) (exemption 
for informational materials but not travel); see also TSRA, 22 U.S.C. § 7209(b) 
(2012) (barring the President from authorizing Cuban travel for “tourist activities”). 
 26. Iran Sanctions Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104–172, 110 Stat. 1541 (1996) (codified 
at 50 U.S.C. § 1701) (as amended). 
 27. Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, Pub. L. 115–44, 
131 Stat. 886 (2017) (to be codified at 22 U.S.C. § 9401). 
 28. Id. § 216 (to be codified at 22 U.S.C. § 9511).  The President objected to 
section 216 on constitutional grounds in two signing statements, the formal and the 
colloquial.  See Press Release, White House Office of Press Sec’y, President Donald 
J. Trump Signs H.R. 3364 into Law (Aug. 2, 2017), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-signs-h-r-
3364-law/; Press Release, White House Office of Press Sec’y, Statement by President 
Donald J. Trump on Signing the “Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanc-
tions Act” (Aug. 2, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-
statements/statement-president-donald-j-trump-signing-countering-americas-
adversaries-sanctions-act/ (“I built a truly great company worth many billions of dol-
lars. . . . I can make far better deals with foreign countries than Congress.”). 
 29. See 31 C.F.R. § 501.801 (2017).  
 30. See, e.g., Cuban Democracy Act, 22 U.S.C. § 6005(a)(1) (2012) (“Notwith-
standing any other provision of law, no license may be issued for any transaction 
described in section 515.559 . . . .”). 
 31. See 31 C.F.R. § 501.801 (2017).  
7
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general licenses as part of its regulations.32  Persons covered by a general 
license may engage in the licensed conduct without applying for individual 
permission although they must comply with the terms and limits of the gen-
eral license, which sometimes include reporting and recordkeeping require-
ments.33  Specific licenses, which are not published, give named licensees 
permission to engage in particular conduct, again subject to terms and limits 
set by OFAC.34  OFAC sometimes publishes “statements of licensing policy,” 
which indicate circumstances in which it is prepared to issue specific licens-
es.35  Licensing is one of the ways in which OFAC exercises its regulatory 
authority.  By contrast, Congress has withheld from the President the authori-
ty to regulate certain transactions (such as trade in informational materials).36  
OFAC recognizes that these transactions are beyond its authority by publish-
ing “exemptions.”37 
TWEA sanctions regulate conduct by any “person subject to the juris-
diction of the United States.”38  This term is defined to include foreign organ-
izations owned or controlled by U.S. persons, such as foreign subsidiaries of 
U.S. companies.39  Asserting jurisdiction over foreign-incorporated entities 
provoked controversies with U.S. allies,40 which has caused OFAC to avoid 
the term since the 1970s in favor of the narrower “United States person.”41  
The narrower term still reaches foreign branches but not separately-
incorporated subsidiaries.42  This change helped reduce diplomatic controver-
sy over “extraterritoriality,” but domestic advocates of sanctions came to 
decry what is sometimes called the “subsidiary loophole.”43  In the 1990s, 
OFAC introduced a middle-ground position, prohibiting U.S. persons from 
“facilitating” conduct by non-U.S. persons (including their own foreign sub-
sidiaries) that U.S. persons may not lawfully perform themselves – meaning 
that foreign subsidiaries could transact business with sanctioned countries if 
they could do so without any support by their parent company or other U.S. 
persons.44  This position failed to satisfy sanctions advocates, however, espe-
 
 32. Id.  
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. See, e.g., 31 C.F.R. § 560.523 (2017). 
 36. See, e.g., IEEPA, 50 U.S.C. § 1702(b)(3)–(4) (2012) (exemptions for travel 
and informational materials).  
 37. See, e.g., 31 C.F.R. § 560.210 (2017) (exempting certain transactions from 
the Iran prohibitions).   
 38. See, e.g., 31 C.F.R. § 515.201(b)(1) (2017), discussed infra Part IV. 
 39. 31 C.F.R. § 515.329(d) (2017). 
 40. See LOWENFELD, supra note 4, at 901–15 (discussing past controversies). 
 41. See, e.g., 31 C.F.R. §§ 538.208, 538.209 (2017). 
 42. See 31 C.F.R. § 538.315 (2017). 
 43. See, e.g., Stanley J. Marcuss, Grist for the Litigation Mill in U.S. Economic 
Sanctions Programs, 30 L. & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 501, 524 (1999). 
 44. 31 C.F.R. §§ 560.208, 560.417 (2017). 
8
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cially as momentum built for stricter sanctions against Iran.45  In 2012, Con-
gress extended the OFAC sanctions against Iran beyond U.S. persons to for-
eign subsidiaries.46  While clearly asserting prescriptive jurisdiction over 
foreign subsidiaries, Congress seems to have tried to temper the international 
reaction by specifying that enforcement for violations by a foreign subsidiary 
would be directed against the U.S. parent rather than the foreign subsidiary.47 
Finally, the concept of “extraterritorial sanctions” should be compared 
with its cousin, “secondary sanctions.”  Extraterritorial sanctions govern con-
duct by persons located outside the sending state.48  Relatively uncontrover-
sial examples govern the conduct of nationals located abroad – for example, 
the foreign branches of U.S. banks may not transact business with Iran, and 
U.S. engineers employed abroad by foreign companies may not design pro-
jects to be built in Iran.49  Mostly, however, the term “extraterritorial sanc-
tions” is used critically, when accusing the sending state of acting beyond the 
bounds of prescriptive jurisdiction allowed by international law.50  Contro-
 
 45. See, e.g., Minimizing Potential Threats from Iran: Administration Perspec-
tives on Economic Sanctions and Other U.S. Policy Options: Hearing Before the 
Senate Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs Comm., 111th Cong. 44 (2009) (statement of 
Senator Jeff Merkley expressing concern about a “huge loophole”). 
 46. See Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (“ITRA”), 
22 U.S.C. § 8725 (2012); 31 C.F.R. § 560.215 (2017).  In January 2016, pursuant to 
the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (“JCPOA”) concerning Iran’s nuclear pro-
gram, Annex 2, § 5.1.2, OFAC issued General License H, which authorizes foreign 
subsidiaries of U.S. companies to engage in certain dealings with Iran and further 
authorizes U.S. parents to take certain actions that would otherwise constitute illegal 
facilitation.  See Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, U.S. DEP’T STATE (July 14, 
2015), http://www.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/iran/jcpoa/; U.S. DEP’T TREASURY, IRAN 
GENERAL LICENSE H (Jan. 16, 2016), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/iran_glh.pdf. 
 47. See 22 U.S.C. § 8725(c).  By contrast, in the case of Cuba, OFAC asserts 
both prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction over foreign subsidiaries.  For a recent 
example of a penalty paid by a foreign subsidiary for conduct by the foreign subsidi-
ary (and another foreign affiliate) outside of the United States, see infra note 110. 
 48. “The state . . . that imposes the sanction is sometimes called the sender, and 
the object of the sanction is sometimes called the target.”  Barry E. Carter & Ryan M. 
Farha, Overview and Operation of U.S. Financial Sanctions, Including the Example 
of Iran, 44 GEO. J. INT’L L. 903, 904 n.4 (2013) (citing GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER ET 
AL., ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED 2 (3d ed. 2007)).  
 49. See 31 C.F.R. § 560.204 (2017) (applying the prohibition on exporting ser-
vices to Iran to “a United States person, wherever located”).  The extraterritorial im-
pact of the recently-suspended ban on exporting services to Sudan is somewhat nar-
rower, applying to U.S. individuals outside the United States only when they are “or-
dinarily resident in the United States.”  31 C.F.R. §§ 538.205, 538.406(a)(4) (2017); 
cf. 31 C.F.R. § 560.410 (2017) (omitting the residency language from the prohibition 
on exporting services to Iran). 
 50. In this regard, I concur with John Knox that criticism should more properly 
be directed against “extrajurisdictionality” because there are in fact various circum-
stances where states may lawfully assert jurisdiction over conduct beyond their terri-
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versial examples include the OFAC rule that prohibits foreign companies 
from selling to Iran foreign-made products that contain ten percent or more 
U.S.-origin content, the application of sanctions to foreign-incorporated sub-
sidiaries, and, of course, the Helms-Burton Act and the Iran Sanctions Act.51 
A “secondary sanction,” adapting Lowenfeld’s definition of an econom-
ic sanction to this context,52 is an economic measure taken for the political 
end of inducing third states or non-state actors in third states to change their 
policies or practices concerning economic dealings with the target of the 
sending state’s “primary sanctions.”  While primary sanctions may be en-
forced by criminal prosecution or civil fines,53 secondary sanctions are en-
forced by economic measures.54 
The reason for the sanction – inducing a change in behavior by third 
parties toward the primary target – is key to understanding its nature as a 
secondary sanction.  In this regard, Senator Alfonse D’Amato, the primary 
sponsor of the Iran Sanctions Act (which originally applied to Libya as well), 
bluntly set forth the essence of a secondary sanction: “Now the nations of the 
world will know they can trade with them [Iran and Libya] or trade with us.  
 
tory.  John H. Knox, A Presumption Against Extrajurisdictionality, 104 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 351 (2010).  On the international law of jurisdiction, see generally RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 401–433 (AM. LAW 
INST. 1987). 
 51. See 31 C.F.R. § 560.205 (2017) (expressly prohibiting certain “reexportation 
from a third country . . . by a person other than a United States person”); 31 C.F.R. § 
560.420 n.3 (2017) (“The provisions of § 560.205 and this section apply only to per-
sons other than United States persons.”).  The case against Mohammed Sharbaf, an 
Iranian citizen located outside the United States, presents an interesting (apparently 
quite rare) example of enforcement of section 560.205: he was indicted in 2005 but 
never arrested and, in January 2016, the government dismissed the charges against 
him (albeit without prejudice) due to “significant foreign policy interests” as part of a 
deal in which Iran released four Americans.  United States v. Quinn, 401 F. Supp. 2d 
80, 103 & n.23 (D.D.C. 2005) (addressing the section 560.205 charges against Shar-
baf in a decision on a motion by his co-defendants); Government’s Motion to Dismiss 
Indictment, United States v. Mohammad Sharbaf, No. 05-CR-018 (JDB), (D.D.C. 
Jan. 16, 2016); Josh Gerstein, Obama Grants Clemency to Seven in Iran Deal, 
POLITICO (Jan. 16, 2016, 3:38 PM), https://www.politico.com/blogs/under-the-
radar/2016/01/iran-deal-obama-grants-clemency-to-seven-217879 (noting that, in 
addition to seven pardons, the government also dropped charges against Sharbaf and 
others). 
 52. See supra notes 6–9. 
 53. See Economic Sanctions Enforcement Guidelines, 31 C.F.R. pt. 501, app. A 
(2017). 
 54. See, e.g., Iran Sanctions Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104–172, § 6, 110 Stat. 1541 
(1996), (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1701) (as amended) (creating a menu of sanctions 
from which the President may choose, including restrictions on exports from the 
United States, lending by U.S. banks, and investments in the United States). 
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They have to choose.”55  Indeed, the ISA is a classic example of a secondary 
sanction: it imposes U.S. sanctions on third states and their businesses that 
engage in certain economic dealings with Iran in an effort to induce them to 
curtail those dealings.56 
Secondary sanctions are extraterritorial, though extraterritorial sanctions 
need not be secondary.  For example, the extension of OFAC rules to foreign 
branches and (sometimes) subsidiaries of U.S. persons is part of the primary 
sanctions.  Likewise for the rules governing U.S. individuals located outside 
the United States and reexports by foreign persons outside the United 
States.57  Another example is stickier: until President Obama terminated the 
Burma sanctions in October 2016, OFAC expressly prohibited U.S. persons 
from investing in a third-country company “where the company’s profits are 
predominantly derived” from Burma.58  Jeffrey Meyer describes this as a 
secondary sanction,59 and it surely shares some elements with a secondary 
sanction – in fact, it closely resembles state laws ordering state pension funds 
not to invest in companies doing business with target countries.60  Neverthe-
less, the purposive element needed to make this rule a secondary sanction is 
not evident: the public record does not suggest this rule aimed to pressure 
third-country companies to reduce their business in Burma (in marked con-
trast with the evidence on, for example, the Iran Sanctions Act).61  Rather, the 
rule prevented U.S. persons from doing indirectly what they could not do 
directly.  Understanding the rule as a means of closing the side door aligns it 
with the many other OFAC rules that address evasion, avoidance, facilitation, 
 
 55. Jerry Gray, Foreigners Investing in Libya or in Iran Face U.S. Sanctions, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 24, 1996), http://www.nytimes.com/1996/07/24/world/foreigners-
investing-in-libya-or-in-iran-face-us-sanctions.html. 
 56. See generally Jeffrey A. Meyer, Second Thoughts on Secondary Sanctions, 
30 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 905 (2009) (arguing that secondary sanctions are allowed under 
the international law of prescriptive jurisdiction when they have sufficient territorial 
and nationality ties to the sending state, and that ISA largely passes this test). 
 57. See supra notes 49–51. 
 58. 31 C.F.R. § 537.412(a) (2015) (repealed by Exec. Order No. 13,742, 81 Fed. 
Reg. 70,593 (Oct. 7, 2016)). 
 59. See Meyer, supra note 56, at 932. 
 60. See generally Bechky, supra note 9, at 823–24 & n.2, 835–36, 843–47. 
 61. Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. 104–208, § 570, 110 
Stat. 3009 (1996) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2378) (authorizing the President to prohibit 
U.S. persons from making “new investment in Burma” and directing the President to 
coordinate a multilateral strategy with other interested countries, without any threat 
against countries that do not cooperate with the multilateral strategy); Exec. Order 
No. 13,047, 62 Fed. Reg. 28,301 (May 20, 1997) (exercising the statutory authority to 
prohibit “new investment in Burma”).  When OFAC adopted regulations implement-
ing the investment ban, it added the third-country rule as an interpretative gloss on the 
ban, not as a separate prohibition.  31 C.F.R. § 537.405(a) (2005) (later renumbered § 
537.412(a)); Burmese Sanctions Regulations, 63 Fed. Reg. 27,846 (May 21, 1998) 
(construing the investment ban in section 537.201). 
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and dealing “directly or indirectly” with sanctions targets.62  So understood, 
this rule too was part of the primary sanctions. 
III.  ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND IEL’S BLURRED EXTERNAL 
BOUNDARIES 
In 1948, Georg Schwarzenberger advocated treating IEL as a field sepa-
rate from “general principles of international law.”63  In today’s vocabulary, 
Schwarzenberger called for fragmentation: 
It would seem that the time has come for the establishment of separate 
branches of international law . . . . Such specialisation will not only re-
sult in providing more adequate knowledge in the narrower fields, but 
 
 62. These concepts appear throughout OFAC regulations.  In the Burma context, 
see, e.g., 31 C.F.R. §§ 537.202 (2015) (prohibiting direct and indirect financial ser-
vices), 537.205 (2015) (facilitation), 537.206 (2015) (evasion and avoidance).  An 
alternative reading of section 537.412 is possible, which also keeps it within the pri-
mary embargo: the predominance test could be seen as creating a safe harbor that 
allowed U.S. persons to invest relatively safely in third-country companies that 
earned some, but not predominant, profits in Burma.  In other sanctions programs, 
which lack Burma’s relatively clear predominance test, U.S. investors must consider 
where to draw the line when investing in third-country companies that transact some 
business in or with sanctioned countries.  See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,219, 66 Fed. 
Reg. 34,777 (June 26, 2001) (Blocking Property of Persons Who Threaten Interna-
tional Stabilization Efforts in the Western Balkans) (no predominance test); Exec. 
Order No. 13,382, 70 Fed. Reg. 38,567 (June 28, 2005) (Blocking Property of Weap-
ons of Mass Destruction Proliferators and Their Supporters) (no predominance test).  
Support for this alternative reading may be found in correspondence indicating that 
other OFAC programs also restrict investments in third-country companies even ab-
sent express equivalents to section 537.412.  See, e.g., Letter from Linda Robertson, 
Assistant Sec’y, Legislative Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, to Rep. Frank Wolf 
1–2 (Dec. 13, 1999) (on file with author) (applying predominance test to investments 
in third-country companies doing business with Iran); Letter from R. Richard New-
comb, Dir., Office of Foreign Assets Control, to John S. Kavulich II at 1 (undated) 
(on file with author) (permitting non-controlling secondary-market investments in 
third-country companies doing business with Cuba, without mentioning the extent of 
the company’s business in Cuba as a relevant factor).  Thus, the nature of these re-
strictions remains a live question after the end of the Burma sanctions.  Indeed, paral-
lel questions also persist about restrictions on selling to third-country companies that 
make sales to target countries.  See, e.g., 31 C.F.R. § 560.204 (2017) (prohibiting 
sales to third-country persons in certain circumstances, including when “undertaken 
with knowledge or reason to know” that the items sold will be incorporated into prod-
ucts to be supplied “exclusively or predominantly to Iran”). 
 63. Georg Schwarzenberger, The Province and Standards of International Eco-
nomic Law, 2 INT’L L.Q. 402, 404 (1948). 
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is likely to enrich insight into the nature, functions and principles of 
the law of nations as such.64 
Schwarzenberger did not offer a definition per se of IEL, instead sug-
gesting that it is concerned with the “intricate legal aspects” of “international 
economic relations.”65  He then listed several topics “considered to fall within 
the purview of international economic law,” including “[t]he law relating to 
trading with the enemy”66 – which is to say, economic sanctions.67 
More recently, the discipline of IEL has been associated with the late 
John Jackson more than any other scholar.  As Tomer Broude wrote, it was 
“Jackson who most promoted the ongoing consolidation of the field, through 
his professional devotion and through his skills as a clear thinker, effective 
communicator, and admired teacher.”68  Jackson founded the Journal of In-
ternational Economic Law and the Institute of International Economic Law at 
Georgetown, and he supported younger scholars in their initiative to launch 
the Society of International Economic Law.69 
In the inaugural article of the Journal of International Economic Law, 
Jackson wrote: “It is appropriate to ask what we mean by ‘international eco-
nomic law’.  This phrase can cover a very broad inventory of subjects: em-
bracing the law of economic transactions; government regulation of economic 
matters; and related legal relations including litigation and international insti-
tutions for economic relations.”70  Having defined his subject matter spa-
ciously, Jackson made clear that, for him at least, the heart of the matter was 
regulation by governments (alone or together) of economic activity: “The 
fundamental subject appears to be the question of ‘regulation of economic 
behaviour which crosses national borders’.”71 
 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 402. 
 66. Id. at 405. 
 67. Lest there be any doubt that Schwarzenberger was referring to sanctions, it 
should be recalled that, at that time, the main statute authorizing U.S. sanctions was 
the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917 – which in turn was named (and modeled) 
after the British Trading with the Enemy Act of 1914.  See TWEA, 50 U.S.C. §§ 
4301–41 (2012). 
 68. Tomer Broude, A Field of His Own: John Jackson and the Consolidation of 
International Economic Law as a Scholarly Domain, 19 J. INT’L ECON. L. 329, 330 
(2016). 
 69. Id. 
 70. John H. Jackson, Global Economics and International Economic Law, 1 J. 
INT’L ECON. L. 1, 8 (1998). 
 71. Id. at 12; accord id. at 9 (“[A]rguably in today’s world the real challenges for 
understanding IEL and its impact on governments and private citizens’ lives, suggest 
a focus on IEL as ‘regulatory law’, similar to domestic subjects such as tax, labour, 
anti-trust, and other regulatory topics.”); John H. Jackson, International Economic 
Law: Reflections on the “Boilerroom” of International Relations, 10 AM. U. J. INT’L 
L. & POL’Y 595, 596–97 (1995) (describing his “priority choice that downplays the 
transactional law and focuses more on regulation by government institutions”).  
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Sanctions fit within the discipline described by Jackson.  They clearly 
regulate economic behavior that crosses national borders.  To be sure, sanc-
tions aim to restrict economic behavior, not to promote it.  It would be folly, 
however, to define the field as a one-way street including only liberalizing 
measures while excluding restrictions.  No one would deny, for example, that 
raising tariffs is every bit as much a form of economic regulation as cutting 
tariffs. 
Nor does it matter whether raising tariffs is good or bad economic poli-
cy or whether it is motivated by economic or political concerns.  Jackson 
understood this, noting that government regulation of economic matters may 
reflect “goals that are not so oriented towards economics, such as keeping the 
peace . . . .  So we have to construct the institutions that will follow or medi-
ate among these [economic] and other goals such as human rights, crime 
abatement, drug traffic reduction etc.”72  As it happens, the U.S. government 
maintains today economic sanctions aimed at all four of the noneconomic 
goals listed by Jackson: keeping peace, promoting human rights, reducing 
drug trafficking, and abating other crime (especially terrorism).73 
Sanctions thus recall the “trade and culture,” “investment and human 
rights,” and other “and” debates, which examine the relative priorities that 
should be given to economic and noneconomic values.74  In doctrinal terms, 
 
Detlev Vagts laid similar emphasis on regulation in a working definition that he used 
to guide his survey of IEL articles in the first century of the American Journal of 
International Law: “For practical purposes, in this essay I define international eco-
nomic law as the international law regulating transborder transactions in goods, ser-
vices, currency, investment, and intellectual property.  I exclude from the inquiry 
issues of private international law, as well as of economic warfare.”  Detlev F. Vagts, 
International Economic Law and the American Journal of International Law, 100 
AM. J. INT’L L. 769, 769 (2006).  Vagts’ closing caveat, the omission of “economic 
warfare” from his IEL survey, arguably suggests that he may not have regarded eco-
nomic sanctions as part of IEL or at least not as a core part of IEL.  Other readings are 
also possible, however: he may have excluded sanctions only “[f]or practical purpos-
es,” such as limiting the volume of materials covered by his survey or avoiding over-
lap with subjects addressed in other surveys.   
 72. Jackson, supra note 70, at 15. 
 73. See, e.g., 31 C.F.R. pt. 536 (2017) (Narcotics Trafficking Sanctions Regula-
tions); 31 C.F.R. pt. 539 (2017) (Weapons of Mass Destruction Trade Control Regu-
lations); 31 C.F.R. pt. 590 (2017) (Transnational Criminal Organizations Sanctions 
Regulations); 31 C.F.R. pt. 592 (2017) (Rough Diamonds Control Regulations; en-
forcing the Kimberly Process); 31 C.F.R. pt. 594 (2017) (Global Terrorism Sanctions 
Regulations).  Such policy concerns can also be seen in the reasons given for impos-
ing or easing country-based sanctions.  See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,742, 81 Fed. 
Reg. 70,593 (Oct. 7, 2016) (citing Burma’s progress towards democracy as the 
ground for terminating sanctions). 
 74. Lowenfeld similarly ties economic sanctions to the “trade and” debate, not-
ing that both concern questions about which issues governments should prioritize 
over economic gains (and in which circumstances).  Cf. Lowenfeld, supra note 2, at 
368–69. 
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these debates often center on the exception provisions of trade and investment 
treaties.75  Thus, it is notable that these treaty provisions embrace economic 
sanctions.  For example, Article XXI of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (“GATT”) excepts from GATT disciplines both sanctions mandat-
ed by the United Nations (“UN”) and many unilateral sanctions.76  Likewise, 
the U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty includes language akin to GATT 
Article XXI77 and expressly adds a “denial of benefits” clause to make clear 
that the investment protections do not benefit persons subject to sanctions.78 
 
 75. See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures Pro-
hibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products, ¶ 5.3.2.3, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS400/AB/R (adopted May 22, 2014) (construing the public morals exception in 
GATT Art. XX). 
76. Article XXI states: 
 
  Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed . . . (b) to prevent any con-
tracting party from taking any action which it considers necessary for the pro-
tection of its essential security interests . . . (iii) taken in time of war or other 
emergency in international relations; or (c) to prevent any contracting party 
from taking any action in pursuance of its obligations under the United Na-
tions Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security. 
 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. XXI, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 
55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].  In turn, Article 41 of the UN Charter 
authorizes the Security Council to “decide what measures not involving the 
use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it 
may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures.  
These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations. . . 
.”  U.N. Charter art. 41. 
 77. U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty art. 18, 2012 [hereinafter U.S. Model 
BIT] (“Nothing in this Treaty shall be construed . . . to preclude a Party from applying 
measures that it considers necessary for the fulfillment of its obligations with respect 
to the maintenance or restoration of international peace or security, or the protection 
of its own essential security interests.”). 
 78. The U.S. Model BIT states: 
 
  1. A Party may deny the benefits of this Treaty to an investor of the other 
Party that is an enterprise of such other Party and to investments of that inves-
tor if persons of a non-Party own or control the enterprise and the denying 
Party: 
(a)  does not maintain diplomatic relations with the non-Party; or   
(b)  adopts or maintains measures with respect to the non-Party or a person 
of the non-Party that prohibit transactions with the enterprise or that would be 
violated or circumvented if the benefits of this Treaty were accorded to the en-
terprise or to its investments. 
 
Id. art. 17. 
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Two early WTO cases raised the “trade and sanctions” question –
Massachusetts/Burma79 and Helms-Burton Act80 – but the complainants did 
not pursue either case to a panel decision.81  Two new cases filed in 2017, 
both still in early-stage consultations, may yet reach a panel – Russia’s chal-
lenge to Ukrainian sanctions and Qatar’s claims against the blockade by Bah-
rain, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE82 – and the growth in WTO membership 
may augur similar cases in the future.83  The absence of WTO decisions on 
 
 79. See United States – Measure Affecting Government Procurement, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS88/1 (June 26, 1997).  In this case, Japan and the European Union challenged 
restrictions imposed by Massachusetts against purchasing from companies that did 
business with Burma.  See id.  The same Massachusetts law was at issue in Crosby v. 
Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000). 
 80. See Helms-Burton Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 6021–6091 (2012).  In this case, the 
European Union challenged the Helms-Burton Act, discussed infra Part IV. 
 81. Some GATT-era disputes also implicated Article XXI without producing 
much in the way of governing jurisprudence, most notably the unadopted GATT 
panel decision in United States – Trade Measures Affecting Nicaragua, L/6053 ¶¶ 
5.1–5.3 (Oct. 13, 1986) (unadopted), which decided that assessing the Article XXI 
defense was outside its terms of reference.  Report by the Panel, United States – 
Trade Measures Affecting Nicaragua, ¶¶ 5.1–5.3, WTO Doc. L/6053 (Oct. 13, 1986). 
 82. See Ukraine – Measures Relating to Trade in Goods and Services, WTO 
Doc. D/S525/1 (June 1, 2017); Saudi Arabia – Measures Relating to Trade in Goods 
and Services, and Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, WTO Doc. 
D/S528/1 (Aug. 4, 2017). 
 83. In this regard, Lowenfeld once proposed that one of the reasons why “the 
GATT/WTO has had little impact on policies of economic sanctions” was that at least 
twelve states that were “targets of sanctions applied by the Western industrial states 
were not contracting parties to the GATT at the relevant time.”  Lowenfeld, supra 
note 2, at 368–69.  Lowenfeld further noted that the WTO system is aimed primarily 
at combating states’ mercantilist instincts, while “[e]conomic sanctions for political 
ends are the opposite of mercantilism,” calling instead for “sacrifices, on the ground 
that there are issues more important than economic advantage.”  Id. at 369.  A re-
markable joint statement by Austria and Germany, criticizing CAATSA for subvert-
ing cooperation on sanctions for unilateral trade objectives, proposes a bright line 
between sanctions and trade policy and implies that trade disputes will increase if 
sanctions cross that line: 
 
The draft bill [CAATSA] of the US is surprisingly candid about what is 
actually at stake, namely selling American liquefied natural gas and ending 
the supply of Russian natural gas to the European market.  The bill aims to 
protect US jobs in the natural gas and petroleum industries. 
  
Political sanctions should not in any way be tied to economic interests. . . .  
 
Europe’s energy supply network is Europe’s affair, not that of the United 
States of America! 
 
Press Release, Fed. Foreign Office, Foreign Minister Gabriel and Austrian Federal 
Chancellor Kern on the Imposition of Russia Sanctions by the US Senate (June 15, 
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trade and sanctions plainly deprives IEL scholars of oxygen needed to propel 
debate,84 although the normative questions remain.  In principle, at least, it 
makes no more sense to exclude “and sanctions” questions from the scope of 
IEL than to ignore Tuna-Dolphin85 and other “and environment” cases.86 
Like the subjects of other “trade and” and “investment and” debates, 
economic sanctions stand simultaneously both inside and outside the realm of 
economic regulation.  As Jackson once suggested, the “and” subjects lie at 
the “frontier” of IEL87 – perhaps a blurred frontier or a set of overlapping 
 
2017), https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/Newsroom/170615-kern-russland/290666 
(emphasis added).  If there is more “and sanctions” litigation at the WTO, the Article 
XXI defense may prove less bulletproof than is sometimes assumed.  As Andrew 
Mitchell wrote recently, 
[W]here sanctions are pursued unilaterally . . . States are accorded considera-
ble, but not total, latitude [under GATT XXI] in determining whether they are 
justified in invoking the exception.  However, until there is definitive WTO 
jurisprudence to the contrary, States should assume that art XXI is not entirely 
“self-judging” and invocations of art XXI may permit panel review. 
Andrew D. Mitchell, Sanctions and the World Trade Organization, in RESEARCH 
HANDBOOK ON UN SANCTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 284 (Larissa van den Herik 
ed., 2017). 
 84. Cf. Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1075 (1984). 
 85. In the Tuna/Dolphin cases Mexico challenged U.S. restrictions on imports of 
tuna caught using fishing methods that did not comport with U.S. standards for the 
protection of dolphins.  See Panel Report, United States – Measures Concerning the 
Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, WTO Doc. 
WE/DS381/R (Sept. 15, 2011).  For discussion of these cases and their impact on the 
“trade and environment” debate, see, e.g., MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK & ROBERT 
HOWSE, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 520–24 (2005). 
 86. Jackson’s work supports this view.  As far back as 1969, he wrote about 
early sanctions issues arising under Article XXI.  JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE 
AND THE LAW OF GATT: A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON 
TARIFFS AND TRADE § 28.4 (1969).  He and his co-authors discuss sanctions issues in 
their casebook.  JOHN H. JACKSON, ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMIC RELATIONS: CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT ch. 21.4 (5th ed. 2008).  And, 
as editor in chief of the Journal of International Economic Law, he published several 
articles on sanctions: Christopher McCrudden, International Economic Law and the 
Pursuit of Human Rights: A Framework for Discussion of the Legality of ‘Selective 
Purchasing’ Laws Under the WTO Government Procurement Agreement, 2 J. INT’L 
ECON. L. 3 (1999) (regarding the Massachusetts/Burma case); Sarah H. Cleveland, 
Human Rights Sanctions and International Trade: A Theory of Compatibility, 5 J. 
INT’L ECON. L. 133 (2002); Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Trade Sanctions and Human 
Rights – Past, Present, and Future, 6 J. INT’L ECON. L. 797 (2003). 
 87. See Jackson, supra note 70, at 12 (“If you begin to push the frontier of the 
subject, you have to think also of such things as labour regulations, labour standards, 
and even human rights.”).  Describing the “and” subjects as at the frontier of IEL 
must not be understood as calling them unimportant to IEL.  Doctrinally, noneconom-
ic concerns may trump economic concerns in IEL.  See, e.g., GATT, supra note 76, 
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frontiers, a space addressed both by IEL and other disciplines of international 
law.  Sanctions thus remind us of Jackson’s admonition, apparently contra 
Schwarzenberger, that IEL “can not be separated or compartmentalized from 
general or ‘public’ international law.”88  Rather, as Lowenfeld observed, 
“[E]verything is related to everything else . . . . [and] the boundaries between 
them are inevitably blurred.”89 
Indeed, one might go further in challenging the entire idea of IEL as a 
compartmentalized discipline walled off from other legal subjects.  Judith 
Resnik recently reminded us “[h]ow unnatural borders are.”90  They are “arti-
facts of law rather than of land,” and they are “made and remade rather than 
consisting of a natural and stable set of fixtures.”91  Paul Schiff Berman like-
wise pushes against the “convenient fiction that nation-states exist in auton-
omous, territorially distinct spheres” and calls for “preserv[ing] spaces for 
productive interaction among multiple, overlapping legal systems.”92  Bor-
ders are rarely, if ever, the impenetrable Berlin Wall of the public imagina-
tion.93  A river makes a truer metaphor: winding, changing, traversable, fer-
tile, uniting a region as much as dividing the shores.  All the more so where 
the borders are not physical but imagined, and engagement across them can 
promote “productive interaction among multiple, overlapping” disciplines.94 
IV.  ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND IEL’S BLURRED INTERNAL 
BOUNDARIES 
Much IEL scholarship attends to questions about relationships among 
the major fields of IEL, for example, questions about trade and investment: is 
trade law converging or diverging from investment law (and should it con-
verge or diverge)?  Should investment law adopt trade law institutions like 
the WTO Appellate Body and should trade law adopt investment law proce-
dures like private standing – or, conversely, should investment law abandon 
or restrict private standing?  Should trade law terms be transplanted into in-
vestment treaties, and should investment provisions be incorporated into re-
gional trade agreements or even the WTO?  To what extent should trade and 
investment jurisprudence inform each other when they apply similar terms in 
 
art. XX.  Academically, studying the edges of a field may be crucial to understanding 
its nature, its values and priorities, and its place among and relationships with other 
fields. 
 88. Jackson, supra note 70, at 9. 
 89. LOWENFELD, supra note 4, at vii. 
 90. Judith Resnik, “Within Its Jurisdiction”: Moving Boundaries, People, and 
the Law of Migration, 160 PROC. AM. PHIL. SOC’Y 117, 117 (2016). 
 91. Id. at 117, 122. 
 92. PAUL SCHIFF BERMAN, GLOBAL LEGAL PLURALISM: A JURISPRUDENCE OF 
LAW BEYOND BORDERS 4, 10 (2012). 
 93. And even the Berlin Wall, in reality, was overcome numerous times before 
the very people it tried to keep in tore it down. 
 94. See infra Part V. 
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different legal and economic contexts?  And, are trade and investment law 
adjudicators from different planets?95 
One reason these questions arise is because IEL addresses what have 
traditionally been separate fields of regulation.  Separate domestic agencies 
regulate separate subject matters under separate statutes with separate com-
munities of practitioners.  A partial list of IEL-relevant regulators in the Unit-
ed States includes: the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Justice, State, 
and Transportation, the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United 
States, Customs and Border Protection, the Federal Reserve Board, the Fed-
eral Trade Commission, the Internal Revenue Service, the International Trade 
Commission, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the U.S. Trade Rep-
resentative, and state banking and insurance regulators.  These domestic regu-
lators coordinate transnationally with their regulatory counterparts in other 
countries, often but not always through the State Department or U.S. Trade 
Representative.  A host of subject-matter-specific international institutions, in 
varying degrees of institutional formality, has been created to address the 
needs for regulatory coordination.  Again, a partial list includes: the Basel 
Committee, the Financial Stability Board, the International Monetary Fund, 
the International Organization of Securities Commissions, the World Bank, 
and the World Trade Organization.96 
To be sure, the previous paragraph overstates the degree of separation.  
In fact, there are overlaps among the subject areas, cooperation or competi-
tion among the regulators, and attorneys and scholars who work in multiple 
fields. 
Still, it is rare indeed to find a single regulatory regime that purports to 
regulate across the range of these fields.  This makes sanctions a subject 
worth study by IEL scholars. 
To demonstrate how sanctions regulations cut across IEL fields, we 
must dig into the details.  While OFAC has many sanctions programs, in the 
interests of brevity, this Article focuses on just one program – Cuba.  There 
are numerous differences (major and picayune) among the OFAC programs 
 
 95. See, e.g., Joost Pauwelyn, The Rule of Law Without the Rule of Lawyers? 
Why Investment Arbitrators Are from Mars, Trade Adjudicators from Venus, 109 AM. 
J. INT’L L. 761 (2015); Book Symposium on Jürgen Kurtz’s The World Trade Organi-
zation and International Investment Law, 9 JERUSALEM REV. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2014) 
(articles by Giorgio Sacerdoti, Donald McRae, Tomer Broude, and Jürgen Kurtz); 
JÜRGEN KURTZ, THE WTO AND INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: CONVERGING 
SYSTEMS 20–28, 80–83, 244–56 (2016); Tomer Broude, Investment and Trade: The 
‘Lottie and Lisa’ of International Economic Law? in PROSPECTS IN INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW AND POLICY: WORLD TRADE FORUM, 139 (Roberto Echandi & 
Pierre Sauvé eds., 2013); Nicholas DiMascio & Joost Pauwelyn, Nondiscrimination 
in Trade and Investment Treaties: Worlds Apart or Two Sides of the Same Coin?, 102 
AM. J. INT’L L. 48 (2008). 
 96. See generally Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real New World Order, 76 
FOREIGN AFF. 183 (1997) (discussing the value “transgovernmental networks” in 
international governance). 
19
Bechky: Sanctions and the Blurred Boundaries
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2018
20 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83 
and, as the oldest extant OFAC program, Cuba stands apart from the others in 
some important respects.97  Nevertheless, the Cuba program well illustrates 
how OFAC regulates across IEL, its idiosyncratic aspects may be applied or 
adapted in other programs,98 and, in any event, a fundamentally similar anal-
ysis could show the way other OFAC programs also regulate across IEL. 
The United States imposed comprehensive economic sanctions against 
Cuba over fifty years ago.99  President Kennedy started the sanctions in 1962 
when the Bay of Pigs was fresh, the Cuban Missile Crisis was yet to come, 
and public passions against Fidel Castro ran strong.100  Many details of the 
Cuba embargo have changed over time, with liberalizing and restricting 
trends alternating.101 
 
 97. Cuba is the last program grandfathered under TWEA, while newer programs 
rely primarily on IEEPA; it governs foreign subsidiaries of U.S. businesses unlike the 
IEEPA programs (except Iran); it targets all Cubans, not only the government; it em-
phasizes travel restrictions, while Congress deprived OFAC of the power to regulate 
travel to other sanctioned countries; and newer programs tend to use more modern, 
specific language to set forth their prohibitions. 
 98. As happened when Congress extended Iran sanctions to foreign subsidiaries.  
See supra text accompanying notes 46–47. 
 99. Proclamation No. 3447, 27 Fed. Reg. 1085 (Feb. 7, 1962). 
 100. On the historical events, see, e.g., ROBERT A. DIVINE, SINCE 1945: POLITICS 
AND DIPLOMACY IN RECENT AMERICAN HISTORY 110–14 (2d ed. 1979).  Bob Dylan 
nicely captured the public mood: 
 
I had to say something / To strike him very weird 
So I yelled out / “I like Fidel Castro and his beard” 
Rita looked offended / But she got out of the way 
As he came charging down the stairs / Sayin’, “What’s that I heard you say?” 
I said, “I like Fidel Castro / I think you heard me right” 
And I ducked as he swung / At me with all his might 
Rita mumbled something / ‘Bout her mother on the hill 
As his fist had hit the icebox / He said he’s going to kill  
Me if I don’t get out the door / In two seconds flat 
“You unpatriotic / Rotten doctor Commie rat” 
 
BOB DYLAN, Motorpsycho Nitemare, on ANOTHER SIDE OF BOB DYLAN (Columbia 
Records 1964). 
 101. Most recently, the Obama administration tried to shove the Cuba embargo 
decidedly towards retirement.  See Press Release, White House Office of Press Sec’y, 
Presidential Policy Directive – United States-Cuba Normalization (Oct. 14, 2016), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/10/14/presidential-
policy-directive-united-states-cuba-normalization.  Among other important changes in 
Cuba policy, OFAC and BIS eased their restrictions five times through 2015 and 
2016, and President Obama declared, “The embargo is outdated and should be lifted.  
My Administration has repeatedly called upon the Congress to lift the embargo, and 
we will continue to work toward that goal.”  Id.  President Trump, in turn, has com-
mitted rhetorically to preserving and enforcing the embargo: “[E]ffective immediate-
ly, I am canceling the last administration’s completely one-sided deal with Cuba.”  
Remarks by President Trump on the Policy of the United States Towards Cuba, 
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The Cuban Assets Control Regulations (“CACR”) prohibit virtually all 
business between the United States and Cuba except as licensed by OFAC. 
Their breadth is stunning: they target virtually any Cuban citizen located an-
ywhere worldwide, and they govern conduct not only by U.S. persons but 
also by foreign-incorporated entities owned or controlled by U.S. persons.102  
One example captures this span in both dimensions: OFAC once insisted that 
a Sheraton hotel in Mexico, owned by a Mexican subsidiary of a U.S. hotel 
company, evict a Cuban delegation that was staying at the hotel for meetings 
with the Mexican government – notwithstanding a Mexican law prohibiting 
discrimination against hotel guests based on their nationality.103 
Remarkably, given this sweep, the heart of the CACR prohibitions is 
expressed in a single sentence, section 201(b): 
(b) All of the following transactions are prohibited, except as spe-
cifically authorized by the Secretary of the Treasury . . . if such trans-
actions involve property in which any foreign country designated un-
der this part, or any national thereof, has at any time on or since [July 
9, 1963] had any interest of any nature whatsoever, direct or indirect: 
(1) All dealings in . . . any property . . . by any person subject to 
the jurisdiction of the United States . . . .104 
This sentence generally prohibits a U.S. national from buying a Cuban 
cigar because the cigar is “property” in which a Cuban national has (or had) 
an “interest.”  Conversely, it also generally prohibits a person subject to the 
jurisdiction of the United States from selling cars to a Cuban national because 
the payment is “property” in which a Cuban national has an “interest.”  In this 
 
WHITE HOUSE (June 16, 2017, 1:31 P.M.), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-
statements/remarks-president-trump-policy-united-states-towards-cuba/.  In practice, 
however, the Trump administration has announced limited changes focusing mainly 
on restricting travel to Cuba, especially travel under the popular “people-to-people” 
educational exchanges, and even those changes will not take effect until OFAC 
promulgates implementing regulations.  Strengthening the Policy of the United States 
Toward Cuba, 82 Fed. Reg. 48,875, § 3 (Oct. 20, 2017).  The net effect is that, at this 
writing, the Trump administration appears to have ratified much of the Obama liberal-
ization.  See PERRY BECHKY & MICHELLE TURNER ROBERTS, DÉJÀ VU: NEW 
RESTRICTIONS ON CUBA TRAVEL (June 22, 2017), 
http://bcr.tv/BCR_Regulatory_Alert_on_Cuba_Travel_Restrictions_20170622.pdf. 
 102. See generally 31 C.F.R. pt. 515 (2017). 
 103. See James C. McKinley, Jr., Mexico and Cuba Protest Hotel’s Expulsion of 
Havana Delegation, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 7, 2006), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/07/world/americas/mexico-and-cuba-protest-hotels-
expulsion-of-havana.html.  OFAC relieved U.S.-owned hotels from this particular 
burden in 2015 by issuing a general license authorizing services to Cuban nationals 
attending conferences in third countries (except conferences related to Cuban tour-
ism).  31 C.F.R. § 515.581 (2017). 
 104. 31 C.F.R. § 515.201(b) (2017). 
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way, a prohibition against dealings in “property” in which a Cuban person 
has (or had) an interest regulates virtually all trade in goods between the 
United States and Cuba without need to expressly ban exports and imports.105 
Importantly, moreover, the Cuban interests in the examples above go 
further: the Cubans are also said to have an “interest” in the money intended 
to pay for the cigar, in the cars intended for export to Cuba, and even in the 
sales contracts themselves.  This means that no other person subject to the 
jurisdiction of the United States may lawfully transact in either the funds or 
the cars and both become “blocked” (or frozen) until OFAC licenses their 
“unblocking.” 
Compare this to ordinary commercial principles.  The seller owns the 
goods and the buyer owns the funds until the moment of sale.  Afterwards, 
the ownership interests are reversed.  There is no time when the buyer or sell-
er owns both the funds and the goods.  No matter.  OFAC is not bound by the 
law of ownership – nor even by other legally cognizable interests (such as 
liens).106  OFAC defines “interest,” if it can be called a definition, as “an in-
terest of any nature whatsoever, direct or indirect.”107  Unhelpfully, the Su-
preme Court has added that “sweeping statutory language” authorizes OFAC 
 
 105. More modern OFAC programs do tend to expressly proscribe imports and 
exports – Iran, for example.  See 31 C.F.R. §§ 560.201, 560.204 (2017). 
 106. Cf. Consarc Corp. v. OFAC, 871 F. Supp. 1463, 1465 (D.D.C. 1994) (“Equi-
ty and fairness demand that Consarc not be left empty-handed . . . . They clearly can-
not be deprived of both the proceeds of sale as well as the goods sold but not deliv-
ered [to Iraq, under then-existing OFAC sanctions] because of the intercession of the 
government.”), rev’d, 71 F.3d 909, 914 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (“Although Iraq may no 
longer have any interest in its down payment, it still has some interest in the goods for 
which the down payment was paid and some interest in the transaction. The text of 
the statute thus does not clearly forbid OFAC from enforcing its regulation against the 
down payment or the goods themselves.”). 
 107. 31 C.F.R. § 515.312 (2017).  The word “property” is given a comparable 
expanse: the term  
 
shall include, but not by way of limitation, money, checks, drafts, bullion, bank 
deposits, savings accounts, debts, indebtedness obligations, notes, debentures, 
stocks, bonds, coupons, and other financial securities, bankers’ acceptances, mort-
gages, pledges, liens or other rights in the nature of security, warehouse receipts, 
bills of lading, trust receipts, bills of sale, any other evidences of title, ownership 
or indebtedness, powers of attorney, goods, wares, merchandise, chattels, stocks 
on hand, ships, goods on ships, real estate mortgages, deeds of trust, vendors’ sales 
agreements, land contracts, real estate and any interest therein, leaseholds, ground 
rents, options, negotiable instruments, trade acceptances, royalties, book accounts, 
accounts payable, judgments, patents, trademarks, copyrights, contracts or licenses 
affecting or involving patents, trademarks or copyrights, insurance policies, safe 
deposit boxes and their contents, annuities, pooling agreements, contracts of any 
nature whatsoever, services, and any other property, real, personal, or mixed, tan-
gible or intangible, or interest or interests therein, present, future or contingent. 
 
31 C.F.R. § 515.311(a) (2017) (emphasis added). 
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“to regulate ‘any’ transaction involving ‘any’ property in which a foreign 
country or national thereof has ‘any’ interest.”108 
The expansiveness of this conception of “interest” can be seen in the 
following example, which also highlights the impact that U.S. sanctions have 
on world commerce far beyond bilateral trade between the United States and 
Cuba: section 201(b) generally prohibits the Canadian branch of a U.S. bank 
from paying on a letter of credit issued to allow a Canadian company to buy 
Brazilian steel shipped on a Liberia-flagged vessel, if it should turn out that 
the vessel is owned by a Panamanian company in turn owned by a Cuban 
person. 
Such expansiveness obviously presents compliance challenges for busi-
nesses engaged in world trade.  The challenges are compounded by uncertain-
ty about the outer edges of the prohibitions.  Five decades on, OFAC has 
provided precious little guidance about the word “interest.”  If a Cuban has a 
romantic interest in an American, does he or she become blocked property?  
Presumably not, thanks to the Thirteenth Amendment.  If a Cuban has a root-
ing interest in the New York Yankees, does the team become blocked proper-
ty?  Presumably not, because OFAC must have had evidence of such interest 
for fifty years without ever acting on it.  If a Cuban has an aesthetic interest in 
Frank Lloyd Wright architecture, a culinary interest in the restaurants of José 
Andrés, or a scholarly interest in the Model T, do all those properties held in 
the United States or by any person subject to U.S. jurisdiction worldwide 
become blocked property?  Presumably not, because, well, OFAC can’t really 
mean “an interest of any nature whatsoever,”109 can it?  These examples are 
all a bit silly, admittedly, but they highlight the difficulties that arise once the 
concept of “interest” is divorced from legally cognizable property interests 
and is not otherwise clearly circumscribed.  In the infinite variety of possible 
transactions in world trade, it can be difficult (and expensive) to determine 
factually whether there is an arguable Cuban interest in any good or party 
involved in a transaction (even a small one)110 and, if so, to obtain clear and 
timely legal guidance. 
The impact of section 201(b) is not limited to trade in goods.  In fact, its 
breadth sweeps across many other fields of IEL: 
 Tourism – U.S. nationals cannot travel to Cuba except as li-
censed by OFAC,111 on the view that such travel involves deal-
 
 108. Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 232 n.16 (1984). 
 109. 31 C.F.R. § 515.312 (2017) (emphasis added). 
 110. For example, a Cayman subsidiary of Halliburton recently paid a $304,706 
civil penalty to OFAC, on behalf of itself and a second Cayman affiliate, for transact-
ing business with an oil consortium in Angola, in which Cuba Petróleo had a five 
percent stake.  ENFORCEMENT INFORMATION FOR FEB. 25, 2016 (Feb. 2016), 
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/sanctions/CivPen/Documents/20160225_Halliburton.pdf.  OFAC noted that 
the two companies knew or should have known of the Cuban stake.  Id. 
 111. 31 C.F.R. § 515.560 (2017). 
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ings in “property” in which Cuban persons have an “interest.”  
Indeed, the Supreme Court endorsed this reading of section 
201(b): “[I]t is clear that the authority to regulate travel-related 
transactions is merely part of the President’s general authority 
to regulate property transactions.”112  The Court noted that 
“[p]ayments for meals, lodging, and transportation in Cuba are 
all transactions with respect to property in which Cuba or Cu-
bans have an interest.”  Later, OFAC revised its rules to elimi-
nate any nexus to payment, making clear that it considers simp-
ly eating or staying at a Cuban hotel enough to qualify as “deal-
ing” in “property.”113 
 Trade in Services – Likewise, across a swath of service indus-
tries, section 201(b) generally prohibits persons subject to U.S. 
jurisdiction from providing unlicensed banking services, insur-
ance services, legal services, transportation services,114 tele-
communication services, construction services, and so forth to 
Cuba or Cubans.  Everything from the dire (medical evacuation 
services) to the minor (manuscript editing services) needs an 
OFAC license.115  As with travel,116 there is no separate prohi-
bition on exporting services beyond section 201(b), but one can 
infer that section 201(b) reaches services because OFAC has 
published various licenses authorizing certain services, which 
would not otherwise be needed.  Again, the services themselves 
are regulated apart from payment, so (for example) a U.S. law 
firm cannot provide pro bono legal services to a Cuban without 
an OFAC license.117 
 
 112. Regan, 468 U.S. at 232 n.16; see also id. at 234 n.18 (“Regulation 201(b)’s 
general prohibition on transactions involving property in which Cuba or Cubans have 
an interest is what, as a practical matter, prevents respondents from traveling to Cuba. 
. . .  [T]here were no separate ‘travel restrictions’ . . . . The source of all restrictions on 
property transactions is Regulation 201(b) . . . .”). 
 113. Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 69 Fed. Reg. 33,768 (June 16, 2004) 
(codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 515) (repealing provisions allowing “fully-hosted travel” to 
Cuba on the ground, among others, that “a person who accepts goods or services in 
Cuba without paying for them is in fact engaging in a prohibited dealing in property 
in which Cuba or a Cuban national has an interest”). 
 114. See, e.g., United States v. Plummer, 221 F.3d 1298, 1300, 1309–10 (11th 
Cir. 2000) (holding the U.S. government could prosecute a U.S.-Bahamian dual citi-
zen for transporting Cuban cigars on the high seas). 
 115. 31 C.F.R. §§ 515.548(b), 515.577(a)(4) (2017). 
 116. See Plummer, 221 F.3d. at 1307. 
 117. General licenses authorize U.S. lawyers and U.S. law firms to provide certain 
types of legal services to Cubans (but not other legal services) and to receive payment 
for licensed services in some circumstances (but not in others, with a reporting re-
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 Investment – A person subject to U.S. jurisdiction cannot invest 
in Cuba, directly or indirectly, without an OFAC license.  Sig-
nificant challenges arise when such persons make non-
controlling, minority investments in third-country companies 
that in turn invest in Cuba.  U.S. direct investment in Cuba was 
all but impossible until recently, when OFAC started issuing li-
censes that permit it in certain circumstances.118 
 Finance – A person subject to U.S. jurisdiction cannot lend 
money to a Cuban person without an OFAC license and, simi-
larly, cannot lend money to a third-country person for the pur-
pose of financing that person’s business dealings in Cuba.  Sig-
nificant challenges arise when persons subject to U.S. jurisdic-
tion lend to third-country companies that do business in Cuba, 
including diligence about the extent and nature of such business 
and representations and warranties to assure that the loan pro-
ceeds do not further that business.  Such persons are now al-
lowed to engage in certain “microfinancing projects” in Cu-
ba.119 
 Intellectual Property – A person subject to U.S. jurisdiction 
cannot register intellectual property in Cuba or otherwise pro-
tect intellectual property in Cuba without an OFAC license.  
While general licenses cover the basics of intellectual property 
protection in Cuba – including paying registration fees, hiring 
local agents and counsel, and filing lawsuits120 – they do not au-
thorize U.S. businesses to license their intellectual property for 
commercial use in Cuba because that would give a Cuban per-
son an “interest” in “property.” 
 Taxation – A person subject to U.S. jurisdiction cannot pay tax-
es or similar charges to Cuba without an OFAC license, as il-
lustrated by the license for airlines to pay overflight fees to Cu-
ba for crossing through Cuban airspace.121  As licensed travel 
and business increase, more persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction 
 
quirement concerning the payments in some circumstances).  31 C.F.R. § 515.512 
(2017). 
 118. See, e.g., 31 C.F.R. § 515.573(a) (2017) (authorizing “physical presence” in 
Cuba in certain circumstances); Victoria Burnett, American Firm, Starwood, Signs 
Deal to Manage Hotels in Cuba, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 19, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/20/world/americas/american-firm-starwood-signs-
deal-to-manage-hotels-in-cuba.html (discussing specific licenses for Starwood and 
Marriott to manage hotels in Cuba). 
 119. 31 C.F.R. § 515.575(b) (2017). 
 120. 31 C.F.R. § 515.528 (2017). 
 121. See 31 C.F.R. § 515.548(a) (2017). 
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may pay taxes in Cuba, relying mainly on an interpretation that, 
subject to some exceptions, “[a]ny transaction ordinarily inci-
dent to a licensed transaction and necessary to give effect there-
to is also authorized.”122 
 Family Transfers – Although not commonly regarded as a ma-
jor topic of IEL, family transfers are crucial to the economies of 
many countries.123  Without an OFAC license, U.S. nationals 
cannot send remittances to relatives in Cuba, which – yet again 
– involve “property” in which a Cuban has an “interest.”  Two 
general licenses issued in 2015 first quadrupled the limit on 
“donative remittances” to relatives in Cuba (from $500 to 
$2000 per quarter) and then eliminated the dollar limit altogeth-
er.124  As a result, U.S. remittances to Cuba may now top $1 bil-
lion per year.125  Even after the death of a U.S. national, OFAC 
licenses are needed to pay the proceeds of life insurance poli-
cies to Cuban beneficiaries and distribute estates to Cuban 
heirs.126 
As central and far-reaching as this one sentence of section 201(b) is, it 
does not contain the entirety of U.S. sanctions against Cuba.  It would be 
remiss not to mention a few other Cuba sanctions that implicate other aspects 
of IEL.  First, U.S. law mandates the U.S. government to use its “voice and 
vote” against Cuba’s admission to international financial institutions (“IFIs”), 
including the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, and threatens to 
cut the U.S. contribution to any IFI that extends assistance to Cuba over U.S. 
objection.127  Second, U.S. law seeks to inhibit shipping and cruising involv-
ing Cuba by denying entry into U.S. ports to any vessel carrying goods or 
passengers to or from Cuba and (for some purposes) extending such denial 
for 180 days after the vessel leaves Cuba.128  Third, Florida state law previ-
 
 122. See 31 C.F.R. § 515.421(a) (2017). 
 123. See, e.g., Ralph Chami & Connel Fullenkamp, Beyond the Household, 50 
FIN. & DEV. 48, 48 (2013) (“In 2011 . . . remittances were at least 1 percent of GDP 
for 108 countries; and 5 percent of GDP or more for 44 countries.  For 22 countries, 
remittances represented 10 percent or more of GDP . . . .”). 
 124. See Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 80 Fed. Reg. 2291, 2291 (Jan. 16, 
2015) (amending 31 C.F.R. § 515.570 to raise the limits from $500 to $2000 per quar-
ter); Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 80 Fed. Reg. 56,915, 56,917 (Sept. 21, 2015) 
(amending 31 C.F.R. § 515.570 to remove the limitation on donative remittances). 
 125. See Dudley Althaus & José de Córdoba, For Cubans, U.S. Cash Trickles In, 
WALL ST. J. (Jan. 13, 2016) (citing estimates for 2015 between $770 million and $1.8 
billion). 
 126. 31 C.F.R. § 515.524(b) (estates), § 515.526 (life insurance), § 515.570 (re-
mittances, including life insurance proceeds) (2017). 
 127. Helms-Burton Act, 22 U.S.C. § 6034(a)(1), (c) (2012). 
 128. 31 C.F.R. § 515.207(a) (2017). 
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ously barred companies from bidding on state contracts if any of their affili-
ates did business with Cuba, although the courts declared the state law 
preempted due to conflict with federal law.129 
Three other provisions affected Cuba until 2015, when the Obama ad-
ministration removed Cuba from the list of state sponsors of terrorism 
(“SST”).130  These provisions continue to apply to Iran, Sudan, and Syria.131  
First, Congress enacted a special exception to sovereign immunity that per-
mits certain human rights cases to be brought against SST countries.132  These 
cases have led to some large default judgments, and Congress has sought to 
help plaintiffs execute these judgments, including execution against blocked 
funds.133  Second, the Securities and Exchange Commission requires en-
hanced disclosure about business dealings in SST countries, even at business 
levels that would not normally be regarded as material and even where the 
conduct was undertaken lawfully by foreign issuers that are not governed by 
OFAC regulations.134  Third, Florida bars state universities from spending 
state money on travel to SST countries, even where OFAC licenses such trav-
el (in the case of Cuba) or Congress exempts travel from OFAC regulation (in 
the case of all other countries).135 
Finally, two U.S. statutes illuminate – and cut across – the blurred inter-
nal boundaries of IEL.  Both arise out of Cuba’s mass nationalization of 
property in the 1960s.  The United States has long claimed that Cuba owes 
 
 129. See Odebrecht Constr., Inc. v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Transp., 715 F.3d 1268, 
1287 (11th Cir. 2013).  Florida’s law calls to mind the earlier Massachusetts/Burma 
controversy, which is discussed extensively in Odebrecht.  Id. at 1274–75, 1280–87 
(following Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000)).  Some 
WTO members (including Brazil, where the plaintiff’s parent company was based) 
expressed concerns about inconsistencies between Florida’s law and U.S. obligations 
under the Government Procurement Agreement, but the domestic courts enjoined the 
law before any WTO case was filed.  Id. at 1279–80. 
 130. See Rescission of Determination Regarding Cuba, 80 Fed. Reg. 31,945 (June 
4, 2015). 
 131. State Sponsors of Terrorism, U.S. DEP’T STATE, 
http://www.state.gov/j/ct/list/c14151.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2018). 
 132. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(1) 
(2012) (creating an exception to immunity for cases alleging “personal injury or death 
that was caused by an act of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage 
taking, or the provision of material support or resources for such an act”). 
 133. See FSIA, 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(7), (f) (2012) (allowing execution against 
sovereign assets, even where blocked by OFAC, to satisfy judgments of cases brought 
under section 1605A); 22 U.S.C. § 8772 (2012) (allowing execution against assets 
restrained by the Southern District of New York in Peterson v. Iran).  The Supreme 
Court upheld section 8772 in Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1317 
(2016), discussed infra Part V.  
 134. See Bechky, supra note 9, at 856–58. 
 135. See Faculty Senate of Fla. Int’l Univ. v. Winn, 616 F.3d 1206, 1211–12 (11th 
Cir. 2010) (upholding Florida’s Travel Act). 
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compensation for these nationalizations,136 and the State Department reported 
that bilateral talks about these claims finally began in December 2015.137 
In the Helms-Burton Act of 1996, the United States sought to dissuade 
international companies from buying properties taken from U.S. persons (in-
cluding Cubans who later emigrated to the United States) or otherwise “traf-
ficking” in such properties by subjecting “traffickers” to U.S. lawsuits and 
denying their executives and their families entry into the United States.138  In 
response, the European Communities filed a WTO case against the United 
States.139  The United States then suggested that it would raise a national se-
curity defense, claiming in particular that this defense is self-judging.140  In 
other words, the U.S. position would have enabled any WTO Member to in-
voke a national security defense successfully in any case without any (mean-
ingful) independent check by the panel or Appellate Body.141  This was an 
explosive position to present to the then-newborn WTO142 – even more so 
 
 136. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 402–03 (1964) 
(“Our State Department has described the Cuban law [authorizing expropriation of 
properties owned by U.S. nationals] as ‘manifestly in violation of those principles of 
international law which have long been accepted by the free countries of the West.  It 
is in its essence discriminatory, arbitrary and confiscatory.’” (quoting State Dep’t 
Note No. 397, to Cuban Ministry of Foreign Relations (July 16, 1960)).  The U.S. 
government assigned responsibility to assess and valuate claims by U.S. nationals 
against Cuba to the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, which certified 5911 
claims with total principal of about $1.8 billion.  See Completed Programs – Cuba, 
U.S. DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/fcsc/claims-against-cuba (last visited Mar. 
22, 2018). 
 137. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, Senior State Department Official on 
Cuba Claims Discussions (July 29, 2016), https://2009-
2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/07/260666.htm. 
 138. See Helms-Burton Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 6081–6085, 6091 (2012). 
 139. Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the European Communities, 
United States – The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS38/2 (Oct. 8, 1996).  This case also addressed the Iran and Libya Sanctions 
Act of 1996 (now, the ISA), which originally imposed sanctions on third-country 
businesses that invested in the Iranian and Libyan oil industries.  See id. 
 140. See John A. Spanogle, Jr., Can Helms-Burton Be Challenged Under WTO?, 
27 STETSON L. REV. 1313, 1329 (1998). 
 141. Cf. José E. Alvarez & Tegan Brink, Revisiting the Necessity Defense: Conti-
nental Casualty v. Argentina, 2010–11 Y.B. ON INT’L INVESTMENT L. & POL’Y 319, 
347 (“GATT Article XXI, dealing with certain (but not all) essential security 
measures, accords the greatest measure of deference; indeed, its presumptively self-
judging (‘which it considers’) language scarcely anticipates any room for independent 
assessment by a third party adjudicator . . . .”). 
 142. See John H. Jackson, Helms-Burton, the U.S., and the WTO, 2 ASIL 
INSIGHTS 1, 2 (1997) (“These [national security] exceptions, however, if given a 
broad interpretation could undermine the whole WTO treaty and impair the security 
and stability of the world trading system for which the WTO has been created.”); 
Spanogle, supra note 140, at 1316 (calling the national security defense a “bogey-
man” and “inappropriate and dangerous”). 
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given the risk that the United States might leave the WTO if it lost the nation-
al security argument.143  In the end, the two parties reached a political under-
standing that allowed the Europeans to suspend their case until it expired 
from inaction.144 
In section 211 of the Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998, the United 
States barred the registration or renewal of U.S. trademark rights related to 
certain businesses expropriated by Cuba, except with the claimholder’s con-
sent.145  This prompted the European Communities to bring a WTO case un-
der the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(“TRIPS”).146  Although the TRIPS Agreement has a security exception par-
allel to GATT Article XXI,147 this time the United States did not raise the 
national security defense.  Ultimately, the Appellate Body found in 2002 that 
certain aspects of section 211 denied national treatment and most-favored-
nation treatment in violation of TRIPS, while rejecting most of the European 
claims.148  Nevertheless, many years later, the United States has not yet 
brought section 211 into conformity with TRIPS.149 
 
 143. By way of analogy, after losing in Military and Paramilitary Activities in and 
against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Jurisdiction, 1984 I.C.J. 392 (Nov. 26), the United 
States did not defend itself on the merits and terminated its submission to the compul-
sory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice.  See Dep’t of State Letter and 
Statement Concerning Termination of Acceptance of I.C.J. Compulsory Jurisdiction, 
24 I.L.M. 1742 (1985).  The I.C.J. held that the security exception of the U.S.-
Nicaragua friendship treaty was not self-judging but that treaty omits the words “it 
considers” before “necessary,” which are found in the security exception provisions 
of GATT and the U.S. Model BIT.  See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and 
Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 224 (June 27). 
 144. See European Union-United States: Memorandum of Understanding Con-
cerning the U.S. Helms-Burton Act and the U.S. Iran and Libya Sanctions Act, Apr. 
11, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 529 (1997); DS38: United States – The Cuban Liberty and Dem-
ocratic Solidarity Act, WTO, 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds38_e.htm (noting the sus-
pension of the panel in 1997 followed by the lapsing of the panel’s authority in 1998). 
 145. Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, 
Pub. L. 105–277, § 211, 112 Stat. 2681 (1998). 
 146. See Appellate Body Report, United States – Section 211 of the Omnibus 
Appropriations Act of 1998, WTO Doc. WT/DS176/AB/R (Jan. 2, 2002). 
 147. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 
73, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M 81. 
 148. United States – Section 211, supra note 146, ¶ 360. 
 149. See Status Report by the United States, Status Report Regarding Implemen-
tation of the DSB Recommendations and Rulings in the Dispute United States – Sec-
tion 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998, WTO Doc. WT/DS176/11/Add.156 
(Jan. 15, 2016) (“The United States notes that relevant legislation has been introduced 
in the current 114th session of the United States Congress.  The United States will 
continue to work on a solution that would resolve this matter.”). 
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V.  NEW ISSUES IN SANCTIONS LAW 
Economic sanctions deserve to be the subject of sustained academic ex-
amination.  The economic, diplomatic, and political impacts of sanctions 
alone suffice to warrant this scrutiny.  We are also experiencing a burst of 
creative energy in sanctions, making the scrutiny novel and timely.  In turn, 
that very energy is also heightening due process and other concerns, leading 
to new challenges, institutions, and procedures.  Sanctions thus promise to 
generate a stream of new research questions into the foreseeable future.  This 
Part highlights some recent sanctions developments demanding scholarly 
attention.  Keeping with the themes set forth above about border crossing, the 
following examples call for cross-disciplinary cooperation between IEL and 
other disciplines. 
We have seen already the extent of OFAC sanctions when applied to a 
Cuban national.  Now consider the panoply of legal issues that arise when 
OFAC directs its power against someone living in the United States.  This is 
not an idle hypothetical: OFAC once named a U.S. citizen, Muhammad Sa-
lah, as a Specially Designated Terrorist (“SDT”).  Salah’s complaint against 
OFAC reads like George Orwell meets Lewis Carroll.150  Consider that Salah 
lived in Illinois and needed OFAC licenses to work, buy food, and get medi-
cal treatment for his cancer – and, when OFAC granted him licenses, it often 
did so with delays, time limits, restrictions, ambiguities, and impracticable 
requirements (e.g., to keep receipts for every single living expense).151  And 
this situation went on for seventeen years!152  As the complaint states, “Salah 
survives . . . only at the sufferance of OFAC.”153 
To elaborate briefly, Salah is an Arab-American Muslim who pleaded 
guilty in Israel to aiding Hamas before U.S. law prohibited such aid.154  Due 
to Salah’s aid to Hamas, a U.S. District Court rendered a summary judgment 
finding him civilly liable for Hamas’ murder of a U.S. citizen, but the Sev-
enth Circuit reversed on the ground that a relevant statute did not come into 
effect until after Salah’s arrest in Israel.155  When the United States targeted 
Hamas with anti-terrorism sanctions, OFAC named Salah as an SDT.156  This 
designation had the effect of blocking all of his property in the United States 
and forbidding him from engaging in virtually any transaction in the United 
 
 150. See generally Complaint, Salah v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, No. 1:12-cv-
07067 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 5, 2012) (available at https://ccrjustice.org/home/what-we-
do/our-cases/salah-v-us-department-treasury).  The summary presented here is based 
on Salah’s complaint against OFAC, as the facts were never adjudicated. 
 151. Id. ¶¶ 1–3. 
 152. Id. ¶ 1. 
 153. Id. ¶ 3. 
 154. Id. ¶ 20. 
 155. See Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev., 549 F.3d 685, 691 (7th 
Cir. 2008) (en banc) (Posner, J.). 
 156. See Complaint, supra note 150, ¶¶ 15–16, 20. 
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States without a specific license.157  While OFAC issued several licenses to 
Salah (however imperfectly), it also denied some of his applications, meaning 
that he could not donate to charity or travel to Mecca, both religious obliga-
tions for Muslims.  OFAC ultimately terminated Salah’s designation, appar-
ently preferring that to defending its actions in court.158 
Salah’s complaint is rife with constitutional issues: denial of substantive 
due process by imposing severe consequences on him for conduct that was 
lawful when done; denial of procedural due process by depriving him of lib-
erty and property without notice and opportunity to respond; interference 
with his First Amendment freedoms of association, religion, and speech; and 
imposing quasi-criminal punishments outside the criminal process with its 
attendant constitutional protections.159  Salah also claimed administrative 
violations based on problems with the record and the process for designa-
tion.160 
While Salah’s case presents a distinct set of issues arising from his inti-
mate ties to the United States, the current criminal prosecution of Reza Zarrab 
is the polar opposite: Zarrab is a Turkish-Iranian citizen resident in Turkey 
and his case poses questions about the outer reach of OFAC’s grasp.161  Zar-
rab was arrested in March 2016 at a Miami airport when he tried to bring his 
family to Disney World.162  Charged with helping Iran evade U.S. sanctions, 
he moved to dismiss the prosecution on the ground (among others) that 
OFAC’s regulations generally do not govern conduct of non-U.S. persons 
 
 157. See id. ¶ 3.  OFAC publishes far fewer general licenses permitting dealings 
with designated terrorists than with Cuba.  The existence of unfriendly governments 
is a stubborn fact and, whatever may be OFAC’s wishes, some dealings with such 
governments are needed to protect U.S. interests.  It is much easier to insist that all 
dealings with terrorists must be specifically licensed. 
 158. See Anti-Terror Designations; Anti-Terror Designations Removal, U.S. 
DEP’T TREASURY (Nov. 5, 2012), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Pages/20121105.aspx.  OFAC announced this 
removal on the same day that the government would have had to answer Salah’s 
complaint.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(a)(2) (“[A] United States agency . . . must serve an 
answer to a complaint . . . within 60 days after service . . . .”); FED. R. CIV. P. 
6(a)(1)(C) (extending filing deadlines that fall on a weekend, as here, to Monday). 
 159. See generally Complaint, supra note 150.  In fact, Salah’s blocking persisted 
despite his acquittal of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization (“RICO”) 
charges concerning his alleged relationship with Hamas, the same allegation that also 
appears to underpin his SDT designation.  Salah was convicted of obstructing justice 
for making misstatements in the Boim case.  See id. ¶ 28.  The same questions about 
the interplay between sanctions and criminal law may arise on the international plane, 
where UN sanctions targets may also face charges at the international criminal tribu-
nals. 
 160. Id. ¶ 49. 
 161. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant Reza Zarrab’s Motion to 
Dismiss the Superseding Indictment at 4, United States v. Zarrab, No. 1:15-cr-00867 
(RMB) (S.D.N.Y. July 18, 2016). 
 162. Id. at 6. 
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acting outside the United States.163  The government responded that Zarrab is 
subject to U.S. jurisdiction because he conspired to cause banks in the United 
States to export services to Iran164 by transacting business in U.S. dollars that 
cleared through banks in New York.165  The trial court denied the motion, 
holding that the indictment alleged a sufficient nexus between Zarrab’s con-
duct and the United States to allow the prosecution to continue.166  Should 
Zarrab be convicted, these issues may be considered further on appeal. 
The Zarrab case sits towards the leading edge of an important trend to-
wards extraterritorial enforcement.  An indictment in April 2014 against Li 
Fangwei (also known as Karl Lee) alleged wire transfers through the U.S. 
banking system, as well as some transactions more directly involving the 
United States; the case has not proceeded because Li is not in custody.167  In 
September 2016, the government announced charges against a Chinese com-
pany and four associated Chinese individuals for causing banks in the United 
States to export services to a North Korean entity on the SDN List.168  In Feb-
ruary 2017, OFAC issued a “finding of violation” but no penalty against a 
Taiwanese company that bought oil from Iran (outside the United States, of 
course) on the ground that the company qualified as a U.S. person bound by 
OFAC rules because it was engaged in bankruptcy proceedings before a U.S. 
court and was therefore “present in the United States.”169  In March 2017, a 
Chinese telecommunications company, ZTE, pled guilty to sanctions and 
export control violations for reexporting U.S. goods to Iran and lying to the 
 
 163. Id. at 9. 
 164. See 31 C.F.R. § 560.203(a) (2017) (“Any transaction . . . that . . . causes a 
violation of . . . any of the prohibitions set forth in this part is prohibited.”); 31 C.F.R. 
§ 560.204 (2017) (prohibiting unlicensed exports of services to Iran). 
 165. See Government’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant Reza 
Zarrab’s Motion to Dismiss the Indictment and to Suppress Evidence at 2–3, Zarrab, 
No. 1:15-cr-00867 (RMB) (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 2016). 
 166. United States v. Zarrab, No. 15 CR 867 (RMB), 2016 WL 6820737, at *8–10 
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 17, 2016).  
 167. See Sealed Superseding Indictment, United States v. Li Fangwei (S.D.N.Y.) 
(No. S1 14 Cr. 144) (available at https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/usao-
sdny/legacy/2015/03/25/Li%20Fangwei%20in%20Rem%20Complaint%20and%20S
1%20Indictment.pdf); id. ¶¶ 28(a)–(f) (alleging transfers through the United 
States); id. ¶¶ 28(f)–(k) (alleging other acts directly involving the United States); 
see also Li Fangwei, FBI, https://www.fbi.gov/wanted/counterintelligence/li-fangwei 
(last visited Mar. 22, 2018). 
 168. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Four Chinese Nationals and China-
Based Company Charged with Using Front Companies to Evade U.S. Sanctions Tar-
geting North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons and Ballistic Missile Programs (Sept. 26, 
2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/four-chinese-nationals-and-china-based-
company-charged-using-front-companies-evade-us. 
 169. ENFORCEMENT INFORMATION FOR FEB. 3, 2017 (Feb. 2017), 
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/sanctions/CivPen/Documents/20170203_bwc.pdf (describing penalty against B 
Whale Corporation). 
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U.S. government about it.170  Such cases present issues at the intersection of 
criminal law, foreign relations law (e.g., the presumption against extraterrito-
rial application of U.S. statutes), public international law (especially the law 
of jurisdiction), and even bankruptcy law and corporate law. 
Another case concerning Iran sanctions recently ended with a loss for 
Iran’s central bank at the Supreme Court,171 prompting Iran to initiate a claim 
against the United States at the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”).172  As 
mentioned, Congress has created an exception to sovereign immunity that 
applies only to states designated by the U.S. government as state sponsors of 
terrorism.173  Under this exception, more than 1000 “victims of Iran-
sponsored acts of terrorism” (and their heirs and relatives) won default judg-
ments against Iran totaling “billions of dollars” arising from various acts of 
terror, mostly the 1983 bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut.174  When 
the plaintiffs had difficulty executing the judgments, Congress passed an 
“unusual statute,” which specified that particular blocked assets were to be 
available to execute those exact judgments.175  The Iranian bank objected on 
the ground that Congress had unduly interfered with the judicial process con-
trary to the separation of powers,176 but the Supreme Court rejected the argu-
ment.177  The Court considered that Congress did not improperly direct the 
judiciary how to rule in a particular case because the new statute concerned 
execution, rather than liability, and it still left some issues to be determined 
by the judiciary.178  The Court ended by stressing “Congress’ prerogative to 
alter a foreign state’s immunity.”179  While this last point may be true for the 
U.S. law of sovereign immunity, it is of course the case that no one state may 
 
 170. Paul Mozur & Cecilia Kang, U.S. Fines ZTE of China $1.19 Billion for 
Breaching Sanctions, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 7, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/07/technology/zte-china-fine.html.  The Secretary 
of Commerce, Wilbur Ross, stressed the extraterritorial nature of the case: “We are 
putting the world on notice: The games are over . . . .  Those who flout our economic 
sanctions and export control laws will not go unpunished – they will suffer the harsh-
est of consequences.”  Id.  
 171. See Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310 (2016). 
 172. See APPLICATION INSTITUTING PROCEEDINGS (June 14, 2016), 
http://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/164/19038.pdf. 
 173. See supra note 132. 
 174. Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1319–20.  The Court did not quantify the total 
judgments at issue, but Iran has said that they exceed $56 billion.  APPLICATION 
INSTITUTING PROCEEDINGS, supra note 172, at 3. 
 175. See Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1317. 
 176. In the lower courts, but not at the Supreme Court, Bank Markazi raised sev-
eral other constitutional arguments as well: bill of attainder, ex post facto, equal pro-
tection, and takings.  Id. at 1322 n.14. 
 177. Id. at 1329. 
 178. Id. at 1323–29. 
 179. Id. at 1329. 
33
Bechky: Sanctions and the Blurred Boundaries
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2018
34 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83 
unilaterally amend the international law of sovereign immunity.180  Thus, in 
its ICJ case, Iran claims that the United States has violated its sovereign im-
munity.181  As the Court’s jurisdiction is based on the bilateral Treaty of Ami-
ty,182 however, Iran must show that the treaty protects sovereign immunity, 
an argument that will involve construing terms commonly found in bilateral 
investment treaties (“BITs”), such as “fair and equitable treatment” and “most 
constant protection and security . . . in no case less than that required by in-
ternational law.”183  So, this case intertwines the disciplines of constitutional 
law, federal courts, civil procedure, international investment law, and public 
international law (especially sovereign immunity and allowable responses to 
state-sponsored terrorism). 
Administrative law may emerge as an important issue in sanctions law.  
In May 2017, the D.C. Circuit partially overturned an OFAC civil penalty on 
 
 180. See, e.g., Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.), Judgment, 2012 
I.C.J. Rep. 99, 154–55 (holding that Italy “violated its obligation to respect the im-
munity which . . . Germany enjoys under international by allowing civil claims to be 
brought against it,” even where those claims arose from Germany’s gross violations 
of humanitarian law during World War II); HAZEL FOX, THE LAW OF STATE 
IMMUNITY 13–19 (2d ed. 2008) (arguing that sovereign immunity is a matter of inter-
national legal obligation and criticizing U.S. cases suggesting that immunity is merely 
a matter of discretion and comity). 
 181. APPLICATION INSTITUTING PROCEEDINGS, supra note 172, at 2–3, 9–10, 12–
17. 
 182. Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights, U.S.-Iran, art. 
XXI(2), Aug. 15, 1955, 8 U.S.T. 899 [hereinafter Treaty of Amity] (consenting to ICJ 
jurisdiction over disputes regarding “the interpretation or application of the present 
Treaty”). 
 183. Id. art. IV(1)–(2).  Iran’s application to the ICJ invokes these provisions of 
the Treaty of Amity, as well as several others, which protect property, transferability 
of assets, juridical status, and freedom of commerce.  APPLICATION INSTITUTING 
PROCEEDINGS, supra note 172, at 13–16.  Some of these provisions go beyond the 
terms typically found in a BIT.  For example, Article III(2) intrigues: 
 
Nationals and companies of either High Contracting Party shall have free-
dom of access to the courts of justice and administrative agencies within the 
territories of the other High Contracting Party, in all degrees of jurisdiction, 
both in defense and pursuit of their rights, to the end that prompt and impartial 
justice be done.  Such access shall be allowed, in any event, upon terms no 
less favorable than those applicable to nationals and companies of such other 
High Contracting Party or of any third country. 
 
Treaty of Amity, supra note 182, art. III(2).  The similarity between the Treaty of 
Amity and BITs is no coincidence: U.S. friendship, commerce, and navigation 
(“FCN”) treaties in the 1950s added investment-protection provisions even before the 
world’s first BIT in 1959 and thus constitute an important bridge between traditional 
FCNs and modern BITs.  See generally Herman Walker, Jr., Modern Treaties of 
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, 42 MINN. L. REV. 805 (1958); Kenneth J. 
Vandevelde, The Bilateral Investment Treaty Program of the United States, 21 
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 201, 203–08 (1988). 
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the ground that OFAC failed to consider adequately some of the evidence.184  
Considering how rarely OFAC has lost in court, it is striking that one judge 
would have overturned the entire penalty on the ground that it was based on a 
“confusing, indeed mystifying, decision” that “fudged the answer to the cru-
cial question” and thus failed “to engage in reasoned decision-making” as 
required by the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”).185  Two months 
after this decision, and presumably inspired by it, Exxon sued OFAC under 
the APA and the Due Process Clause for alleged irregularities in a civil penal-
ty proceeding.186  Exxon contracted with a Russian company (Rosneft) that 
was not subject to sanctions, but the individual who signed the contracts for 
the Russian counterparty was an SDN.187  OFAC found that Exxon illegally 
dealt in services performed by an SDN by entering the contracts he signed, 
even though Exxon could have entered the same contracts with the same 
company had another individual signed them.188  Exxon’s complaint alleges 
that OFAC’s findings were “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, and 
otherwise not in accordance with law because, among other things, they . . . 
make meaningless distinctions between Rosneft documents signed by [one 
executive] and identical Rosneft documents signed by any other Rosneft ex-
ecutive.”189 
Some sanctions measures also implicate particular areas of regulatory 
expertise.  For example, divestment by state and local governments from 
companies that do business in sanctioned countries raises constitutional ques-
tions about federalism and due process, but it also involves pension law and 
securities law.190  Bank regulation lies at the core of many OFAC programs, 
which raises the need for both horizontal and vertical coordination because of 
 
 184. Epsilon Elecs., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 857 F.3d 913, 927–28 
(D.C. Cir. 2017). 
 185. See id. at 932–33 (Silberman, J., dissenting).  Epsilon objected that OFAC 
penalized it for illegally exporting goods to Iran through Dubai without finding that 
the goods actually reached Iran, a point that the majority deemed unimportant on the 
ground that the act of exporting (like the act of mailing a birthday card) is complete 
when the goods are sent regardless whether they arrive.  Id. at 920–21 (majority opin-
ion). 
 186. See Complaint ¶¶ 1–2, Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Mnuchin, No. 3:17-cv-1930 
(N.D. Tex. July 20, 2017). 
 187. See id. ¶ 3. 
 188. ENFORCEMENT INFORMATION FOR JULY 20, 2017 (July 2017), 
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/sanctions/CivPen/Documents/20170720_exxonmobil.pdf. 
 189. Complaint, supra note 186, ¶ 68.  Exxon’s case has broad implications for 
risk management by companies that do business with companies affiliated with 
SDNs.  However, Exxon also raises some fact-specific concerns about whether 
OFAC’s view in this case was inconsistent with “authoritative guidance from the 
White House and the Treasury Department” on the same point.  Id. ¶ 71. 
 190. For my views on the constitutionality of state-level divestment, see Bechky, 
supra note 9, and Perry S. Bechky, The Politics of Divestment, in THE POLITICS OF 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 337 (Tomer Broude et al. eds., 2011). 
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the division of bank regulatory responsibilities among state and federal agen-
cies.  New challenges have arisen in the past decade as New York has assert-
ed the power to penalize New York-licensed foreign banks that violate OFAC 
sanctions.191  And the application of OFAC sanctions to the insurance indus-
try raises its own unique challenges because insurance regulation is so heavi-
ly vested in state government.192 
Likewise, with a recent turn towards more criminal prosecution of 
OFAC violations,193 there will be need for greater attention to the interplay of 
sanctions laws with criminal law, criminal procedure, and evidence.  In Sep-
tember 2016, the Seventh Circuit upheld the conviction of Gregory Turner for 
exporting services to four Zimbabwean SDNs.194  Turner argued that the jury 
had to unanimously agree that he had provided services to one or more par-
ticular SDNs.195  The court rejected this argument, holding that it is enough 
for the jury to agree that Turner had provided services to any SDN without 
need for any more specificity.196  In the court’s view, therefore, if one were to 
imagine the jury taking individual votes concerning each of the four SDNs 
and voting 9-3 for acquittal each time, that would suffice to convict if every 
juror voted once for conviction.  The court’s analysis drew on both the word-
ing of the OFAC regulations and general principles of criminal law (the 
means-element distinction).197  The Seventh Circuit also considered the 
meaning of the word “willfully” in sanctions prosecutions, suggesting the 
possibility that a heightened standard of willfulness may apply in this con-
text.198  The court did not clearly decide that issue, however, because it in-
voked the “harmless error” rule and held that Turner would have been con-
 
 191. See, e.g., Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Ben Protess, Benjamin Lawsky, Sheriff 
of Wall Street, Is Taking Off His Badge, N.Y. TIMES (May 20, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/21/business/dealbook/benjamin-lawsky-to-step-
down-as-new-yorks-top-financial-regulator.html (noting that New York’s “fines often 
surpassed those that federal authorities secured”). 
 192. Congress has gone so far as to create a presumption of “reverse preemption” 
of federal law as applied to insurance.  See McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. § 
1011–1015 (2012); U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury v. Fabe, 508 U.S. 491, 500 (1993) 
(describing the Act as “restor[ing] the supremacy of the States in the realm of insur-
ance regulation”). 
 193. See DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SUMMARY OF MAJOR U.S. EXPORT ENFORCEMENT, 




 194. United States v. Turner, 836 F.3d 849, 853–54 (7th Cir. 2016). 
 195. Id. at 861. 
 196. Id. at 861–63. 
 197. Id.  A further wrinkle arose from the fact that this charge in the indictment 
only named three SDNs.  See id. at 863–64.  Turner also failed in his objection that 
adding the fourth SDN was an improper broadening (“constructive amendment”) of 
the indictment.  See id. 
 198. See id. at 860–61. 
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victed under the heightened standard also.199  Turner also tried unsuccessfully 
to suppress some classified evidence obtained under the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act, an issue addressed in a separate classified decision.200  
Questions about the use of classified evidence in sanctions prosecutions are 
bound to recur. 
Finally, it should also be noted that fascinating questions are arising 
about sanctions internationally and in other jurisdictions, notably Europe.  
Consider Al-Dulimi v. Switzerland, decided by the Grand Chamber of the 
European Court of Human Rights in June 2016.201  The Grand Chamber held 
that Swiss courts violated the right to a fair hearing by “an independent and 
impartial tribunal”202 because they failed to provide meaningful review of a 
decision by the Sanctions Committee of the UN Security Council to impose 
sanctions.203  To appreciate the significance of the Chamber’s action, note 
that the UN Charter authorizes the Security Council to “call upon the Mem-
bers of the United Nations,” including Switzerland, to apply measures it 
deems appropriate to “maintain or restore international peace and security,” 
including “complete or partial interruption of economic relations.”204  Fur-
ther, the “supremacy clause” states, “In the event of a conflict between the 
obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter 
and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obliga-
tions under the present Charter shall prevail.”205  The Grand Chamber decid-
ed to presume the Security Council acts consistently with human rights; ab-
sent an express decision depriving Al-Dulimi of domestic judicial review, 
Switzerland was not required to so deprive him and instead was required by 
the European Convention to grant him judicial review.206  Presto!  The Grand 
Chamber’s presumption avoided a conflict between the two treaties and thus 
avoided the question, decided by the European Court of Justice in Kadi, 
whether to give effect to European law over the Security Council order.207  
Al-Dulimi presents important questions about due process and other human 
rights, the powers of the Security Council, the domestic effect to be given to 
Security Council decisions in domestic law, and European constitutionalism. 
 
 199. Id. (discussing United States v. Dobek, 789 F.3d 698, 700–01 (7th Cir. 
2015), in which the court applied a heightened standard of willfulness to prosecutions 
for violating the International Traffic in Arms Regulations). 
 200. Id. at 856–58. 
 201. Al-Dulimi v. Switzerland, App. No. 5809/08, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2016). 
 202. Id. at 9; Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms art. 6(1), Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221. 
 203. Al-Dulimi, at 9. 
 204. U.N. Charter arts. 39, 41. 
 205. Id. art. 103. 
 206. See Al-Dulimi, at 129–30. 
 207. See Cases C-402/05 & C-415/05, Kadi v. Council of the European Union, 
2008 E.C.R. I-06351. 
37
Bechky: Sanctions and the Blurred Boundaries
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2018
38 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
John Jackson once described the noneconomic subjects of the “trade 
and” debates as lying at the “frontier” of IEL.208  However, Jackson also be-
lieved there to be no real border between IEL and public international law.209  
Sanctions illustrate this external borderlessness.  They likewise ignore or 
erase the internal borders with IEL.  Sanctions, accordingly, call to mind a 
quotation attributed to the adventurer Thor Heyerdahl: “Borders?  I have nev-















 208. See Jackson, supra note 70, at 12 
 209. Id. at 9 (stating that IEL “can not be separated or compartmentalized from 
general or ‘public’ international law”). 
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